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or trade name and a famous mark that impairs the distinctiveness of the famous 
mark.” In construing this statutory language, a majority of courts have held that 
to establish blurring, a plaintiff need only show that consumers associate the de-
fendant’s mark with the plaintiff’s famous mark. These courts appear to assume 
that to the extent that there is consumer association, this association alone will 
“impair[ ] the distinctiveness” of the famous mark. A minority of courts have held 
that the plaintiff must show both consumer association and that the consumer as-
sociation “impairs the distinctiveness” of the famous mark. In this Article, we make 
three contributions to the current debate over what must be shown to establish dilu-
tion by blurring. First, we report the results of a set of experiments that reveal that 
the majority approach is fundamentally deficient. These experiments demonstrate 
that even when consumers associate a junior mark with a famous senior mark, 
this association does not necessarily result in any impairment of the ability of the 
senior mark to identify its source and associations. Second, we set forth a new 
method for determining when association is likely to lead to impairment. This 
method, which we term the “association strength test,” evaluates changes in how 
strongly survey respondents associate a mark with its source or attributes upon 
exposure to a diluting stimulus. Third, we evaluate the current state of the art in 
trademark dilution survey methodology: response time surveys. These surveys pur-
portedly show both consumer association and impairment. Through a set of exper-
iments, we demonstrate that these surveys currently use the wrong control and are 
invalid. In light of our findings, we reflect more generally on the question of 
whether dilution by blurring ever occurs and on how the blurring cause of action 
may be reconfigured to better comport with courts’ intuitions about the true nature 
of the harm that the cause of action seeks to address. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Trademark dilution is among the most elusive concepts in 
intellectual property law.1 In theory, dilution occurs when two 
companies use very similar or even identical trademarks in a 
manner that does not confuse consumers as to source. Indeed, 
for dilution to have any meaning as an independent basis for 
trademark infringement liability, consumers must be aware that 
the two marks refer to two different companies. The problem 
that trademark dilution hypothesizes is not confusion; instead, 
the problem is a form of cognitive obstruction—that is, that 
these consumers must “think for a moment”2 whenever they see 
one of the marks to determine to which company the mark refers. 
 1 See J. Thomas McCarthy, Dilution of a Trademark: European and United States 
Law Compared, 94 Trademark Rptr 1163, 1163 (2004) (“No part of trademark law that I 
have encountered in my forty years of teaching and practicing IP law has created so 
much doctrinal puzzlement and judicial incomprehension as the concept of ‘dilution’ as a 
form of intrusion on a trademark.”). 
 2 Richard A. Posner, When Is Parody Fair Use?, 21 J Legal Stud 67, 75 (1992) (ex-
plaining antidilution law on the basis that “[a] trademark seeks to economize on infor-
mation costs by providing a compact, memorable, and unambiguous identifier of a prod-
uct or service. The economy is less when, because the trademark has other associations, 
a person seeing it must think for a moment before recognizing it as the mark of the 
product or service”). On the bench, Judge Richard Posner reasoned similarly in explain-
ing the rationale for protection specifically against dilution by blurring: 
[T]here is concern that consumer search costs will rise if a trademark becomes 
associated with a variety of unrelated products. Suppose an upscale restaurant 
calls itself “Tiffany.” There is little danger that the consuming public will think 
it’s dealing with a branch of the Tiffany jewelry store if it patronizes this res-
taurant. But when consumers next see the name “Tiffany” they may think 
about both the restaurant and the jewelry store, and if so the efficacy of the 
name as an identifier of the store will be diminished. Consumers will have to 
think harder—incur as it were a higher imagination cost—to recognize the 
name as the name of the store. . . . So “blurring” is one form of dilution. 
Ty Inc v Perryman, 306 F3d 509, 511 (7th Cir 2002). 
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This burden on cognition is thought to represent a harm to the 
prior, “senior” user of the mark. For example, if a Brooklynite 
opens a microbar called “Apple” in her neighborhood, it is highly 
unlikely that patrons will be confused into believing that the 
global high technology brand owns the bar and is leveraging its 
brand into the sale of artisanal cocktails. There is no consumer 
confusion as to source. But the concept of dilution asserts that 
the existence of the bar may nevertheless harm the famous 
global brand. When Brooklynites hear the term “Apple,” they 
will associate it with two different entities: Is it the high tech 
company (the senior user of the trademark) or the bar (the jun-
ior user)? As the legal theory goes, this dual association causes a 
“blurring” of the link between “Apple” and the Cupertino com-
pany. This “dilution by blurring” is understood somehow to 
damage the famous brand name by diminishing the immediacy 
with which consumers identify the brand name with its source 
and other preexisting associations. 
The concept of trademark dilution is as controversial as it is 
vague. Trademark scholars are overwhelmingly critical of anti-
dilution protection,3 which appears to grant in gross rights to 
owners of qualifying marks4—such that Apple (the technology 
company) could use antidilution law to prevent nearly any sub-
sequent user from adopting the term “apple” as a trademark 
even when no consumer confusion plausibly results. Commentators 
also question whether ostensibly diluting conduct causes any real 
harm. Professor Christine Haight Farley defies proponents to 
provide even a single concrete (and not hypothetical) example of 
a mark that has been significantly damaged because another 
firm has used that mark in a nonconfusing manner on different 
goods.5 Indeed, it is far from obvious how one establishes whether 
 3 See, for example, Christine Haight Farley, Why We Are Confused about the 
Trademark Dilution Law, 16 Fordham Intell Prop Media & Enter L J 1175, 1187 (2006) 
(“Can no smart attorney, judge, trademark owner or social scientist figure out what dilu-
tion is and how to prove it? If not, why not? I contend that it is because dilution cannot 
be concretized. It cannot be brought into the realm of the real. It exists only in the realm 
of the imaginary.”). See also David S. Welkowitz, Reexamining Trademark Dilution, 44 
Vand L Rev 531, 548–49, 557–58 (1991) (arguing that antidilution protection is inordi-
nately broad and that other areas of trademark law already provide sufficient protection 
for trademark rights). 
 4 See Board of Regents, the University of Texas System v KST Electric, Ltd, 550 F 
Supp 2d 657, 674 (WD Tex 2008) (“Dilution causes of action, much more so than in-
fringement and unfair competition laws, tread very close to granting ‘rights in gross’ in a 
trademark.”). 
5 See Farley, 16 Fordham Intell Prop Media & Enter L J at 1184–85 (cited in note 3). 
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dilution even occurs—not just in a particular litigation, but 
whether it ever even occurs at all.6 How would one go about 
showing that the boîte in Brooklyn has harmed in any way the 
world-famous brand with which it shares a name? Judges too 
remain highly suspicious of antidilution law. 
Making matters worse, federal courts are currently split on 
the basic question of what the plaintiff must show to establish 
that the defendant’s conduct constitutes blurring. Even within 
particular districts, such as the Southern District of New York, 
courts have adopted different standards.7 Federal trademark 
law states that “‘dilution by blurring’ is association arising from 
the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous 
mark that impairs the distinctiveness of the famous mark.”8 In 
construing this language, a majority of courts have held that to 
establish blurring, a plaintiff need show only that consumers as-
sociate the defendant’s mark with the plaintiff’s famous mark.9 
In other words, to win an injunction, Apple of Cupertino would 
 6 See Shari Seidman Diamond, Surveys in Dilution Cases II, in Shari Seidman 
Diamond and Jerre B. Swann, eds, Trademark and Deceptive Advertising Surveys: Law, 
Science, and Design 155, 161–62 (American Bar Association 2012): 
[W]e do not have survey methods that can measure when a particular associa-
tion is likely to lead to impaired distinctiveness of a particular mark. . . . The 
result is that courts both now and in the foreseeable future will have to contin-
ue to struggle, unaided by direct survey evidence, in making predictions about 
the ultimate question: likelihood of dilution. 
See also J. Thomas McCarthy, 4 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition 
§ 24:121 at 437 (Thomson Reuters 5th ed 2018) (explaining the difficulties inherent in
determining whether a junior mark is likely to dilute a senior mark). 
 7 Compare Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v Hyundai Motor America, 2012 WL 
1022247, *11, 13 (SDNY) (finding proof of association conclusive evidence of dilution), 
with Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v My Other Bag, Inc, 156 F Supp 3d 425, 436 n 4 
(SDNY 2016) (rejecting the reasoning in Hyundai because “association is a necessary, 
but not sufficient, condition for a finding of dilution by blurring”), affd, 674 Fed Appx 16 
(2d Cir 2016). 
 8 15 USC § 1125(c)(2)(B). An alternative form of dilution, which we do not discuss 
in this Article, is “dilution by tarnishment.” Federal trademark law defines “dilution by 
tarnishment” as “association arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name 
and a famous mark that harms the reputation of the famous mark.” 15 USC 
§ 1125(c)(2)(C). Tarnishment “generally arises when the plaintiff’s trademark is linked to
products of shoddy quality, or is portrayed in an unwholesome or unsavory context likely 
to evoke unflattering thoughts about the owner’s product.” Tiffany (NJ) Inc v eBay Inc, 
600 F3d 93, 111 (2d Cir 2010), quoting Deere & Co v MTD Products, Inc, 41 F3d 39, 43 
(2d Cir 1994). 
 9 See, for example, Wrenn v Boy Scouts of America, 2008 WL 4792683, *7 (ND 
Cal); Hershey Co v Art Van Furniture, Inc, 2008 WL 4724756, *14–15 (ED Mich); New 
York Yankees Partnership v IET Products and Services, Inc, 114 USPQ2d 1497, 1506 
(TTAB 2015). 
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need show only that patrons of the Brooklyn bar associate its 
name with the Cupertino company (even if there is no source 
confusion). These courts appear to assume that to the extent 
there is association between the defendant’s and plaintiff’s 
marks, this association alone will impair the senior mark’s dis-
tinctiveness of source and other preexisting associations.10 We 
refer to this in what follows as the “mere association” standard. 
A minority of courts have held that the plaintiff must show both 
consumer association and that this consumer association im-
pairs the senior mark’s distinctiveness of its preexisting associa-
tions.11 Here, Apple of Cupertino would need to show that the 
bar calls to mind the global brand and that this calling to mind 
somehow impairs the global brand’s distinctiveness. We refer to 
this as the “association plus impairment” standard. 
The split among courts is surprising, and not just because 
the statutory language appears clearly to call for the association 
plus impairment approach. In the 2003 case Moseley v V Secret 
Catalogue,12 the Supreme Court explicitly stated, albeit in dicta, 
that “‘[b]lurring’ is not a necessary consequence of mental asso-
ciation.”13 The Court could not have been clearer: the mere fact 
that consumers associate the defendant’s mark with the plain-
tiff’s cannot, without more, establish blurring. The Court recog-
nized that there are two different associative links at issue: the 
link between the defendant’s mark and the plaintiff’s mark, and 
the link between the plaintiff’s mark and its source and other 
preexisting attributes. The emergence of the former link does 
not necessarily impact the strength of the latter. And yet a ma-
jority of courts continue to accept evidence establishing mere as-
sociation as sufficient evidence of blurring. 
In this Article, we make three contributions to the current 
debate over the nature of dilution by blurring and what, empiri-
cally, must be shown to establish it in court. First, we report 
findings from a new set of experiments that confirm that the 
 10 See, for example, Visa International Service Association v JSL Corp, 610 F3d 
1088, 1090–91 (9th Cir 2010) (affirming summary judgment for likely dilution of Visa’s 
trademark through a mere association standard). See also McCarthy, 4 McCarthy on 
Trademarks § 24:120 at 432–33 (cited in note 6) (criticizing the Visa court’s reasoning). 
 11 See, for example, Hugunin v Land O’ Lakes Tackle Co, 815 F3d 1064, 1067–68 
(7th Cir 2016) (dismissing dilution claim for absence of harm showing); Gap Inc v G.A.P. 
Adventures Inc, 100 USPQ2d 1417, 1431 (SDNY 2011) (holding that likelihood of associ-
ation absent proof of impairment did not make out dilution claim). 
12 537 US 418 (2003). 
13 Id at 434 (addressing a prior antidilution statute). 
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majority mere association approach is fundamentally deficient. 
In support of the Moseley Court’s dictum (and common sense), 
these experiments demonstrate that even when consumers as-
sociate a junior mark with a famous senior mark, this associa-
tion does not necessarily result in any impairment of the ability 
of the senior mark to identify and distinguish its source and other 
associations. The practical significance of our experimental re-
sults is that survey and other evidence showing merely that con-
sumers associate the defendant’s mark with the plaintiff’s senior 
mark cannot be judged sufficient to establish blurring. All courts 
should require, as a minority of courts currently do, that the 
plaintiff also show that the association between the defendant’s 
and plaintiff’s mark impairs the latter’s distinctiveness of source 
and other attributes. 
Second, we propose an approach that courts should take in 
determining whether association between the defendant’s and 
plaintiff’s marks is likely to lead to impairment. We suggest that 
courts should demand evidence that exposing consumers to the 
junior mark is likely to affect the strength of preexisting associa-
tions between the senior mark and the qualities or attributes to 
which it is linked. Those preexisting associations must first be 
identified. The plaintiff must then establish that exposure to the 
junior mark weakens the link between the senior mark and 
those preexisting associations. We develop and test a methodol-
ogy, which we call the “association strength test,” for producing 
this evidence. Importantly, we find that even this method for de-
tecting impairment produces mixed results. We find some evi-
dence of impairment, yet extremely strong marks (on the order 
of MERCEDES for automobiles) still appear to be resistant to 
blurring. 
Finally, we assess the validity of a possible rival methodology 
for establishing dilution. This is a new form of survey evidence 
taken from the marketing literature: experimental response 
time surveys. These surveys purportedly show both association 
and impairment and should therefore satisfy the association plus 
impairment standard. Though to our knowledge such surveys 
have not yet been used at trial, they represent the current state 
of the art in dilution research. Such studies expose treatment 
subjects to advertisements that ostensibly dilute certain targeted 
marks (for example, an advertisement for a fictitious brand 
called HEINEKEN popcorn), while control subjects are exposed 
to no such advertisements. The studies then compare the speed 
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and accuracy with which the treatment and control subjects link 
various marks, including the targeted marks, with their respec-
tive sources and associations. The studies report that treatment 
subjects take longer to match the targeted marks with their true 
sources and associations and are also less accurate in doing so. 
Both effects are offered as evidence of impairment of distinctive-
ness—and more generally, contra Farley and other skeptics, as 
evidence that dilution by blurring is indeed real.14 
We show, however, that the experimental protocols used in 
these leading response time experiments are fatally flawed. In 
short, they used the wrong control. We report the results of a 
second set of experiments, in which we expose both treatment 
subjects and control subjects to ostensibly diluting advertise-
ments. The difference is that control subjects were exposed to 
ostensibly diluting advertisements for marks other than the tar-
geted marks that were the focus of the test. When using this ex-
perimental design, we find that treatment and control subjects 
produce no significant differences in the accuracy or speed with 
which they link various marks with their respective sources and 
associations. We suggest that when test subjects are exposed to 
any diluting stimuli in the form of a brand-product linkage that 
is unfamiliar to them (for example, NIKE toothpaste), test sub-
jects become wary and cautious, which increases their response 
times and impacts their accuracy in linking tasks. When this 
wariness or surprise is controlled for, no evidence of blurring is 
found. 
Our findings here have both practical and theoretical signif-
icance. As a practical matter, we set forth a valid means of es-
tablishing that the association between a defendant’s mark and 
a plaintiff’s mark impairs the distinctiveness of the latter. 
Furthermore, we show that if response time studies are used in 
litigation, they must use the correct control. They must expose 
treatment subjects to ostensibly diluting stimuli that target the 
mark at issue in the litigation and control subjects to such stimuli 
 
 14 Compare Maureen Morrin and Jacob Jacoby, Trademark Dilution: Empirical 
Measures for an Elusive Concept, 19 J Pub Pol & Mktg 265, 274 (2000) (arguing based on 
experimental evidence that “trademark dilution can reduce the strength of preexisting 
brand associations through the creation of additional nodes in consumers’ brand-based 
memory networks”); Chris Pullig, Carolyn J. Simmons, and Richard G. Netemeyer, 
Brand Dilution: When Do New Brands Hurt Existing Brands?, 70 J Mktg 52, 60 (2006) 
(arguing based on experimental evidence that dilution impacts the accessibility of a sen-
ior mark’s associations), with Farley, 16 Fordham Intell Prop Media & Enter L J at 
1184–85 (cited in note 3) (positing that dilution by blurring rarely, if ever, occurs). 
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that target other marks that bear no relation to the mark at is-
sue but that may nevertheless be surprising or unfamiliar. As a 
theoretical matter, our findings suggest that the best evidence 
we have of dilution by blurring remains, at best, very weak. This 
is alarming. Congress passed the first federal antidilution law in 
1995, which was a poorly drafted failure, and replaced it entirely 
in 2006.15 Many states have had antidilution statutes for dec-
ades.16 Countless court opinions have addressed a dilution cause 
of action. Yet at present, there is still no persuasive empirical 
demonstration that conclusively shows that any appreciable de-
gree of dilution by blurring ever actually occurs. Congress and 
the courts have devoted an enormous amount of effort to regu-
lating a harm that remains essentially hypothetical. 
Part I reviews surveys currently used in dilution litigation 
that show mere association and reports the results of our exper-
iments demonstrating that such surveys do not necessarily show 
impairment of distinctiveness and, as such, do not show blur-
ring. Part I also presents our association strength test. Part II 
reviews current response time studies and reports the results of 
our experiments showing that they are incorrectly designed and 
invalid. Part III briefly discusses the general implications of our 
findings for the question of what dilution is and whether it even 
occurs. We consider in particular the possibility that the theory 
of dilution by blurring remains such an unsubstantiated jumble 
because courts have seized upon antidilution protection as a 
means to prevent something else: misappropriation. This Article 
concludes by considering future directions for research. 
I.  MERE ASSOCIATION AND BLURRING 
As we mention briefly above, a majority of courts that have 
considered an antidilution claim have adopted the mere association 
standard for establishing blurring. That is, they have accepted 
survey evidence that consumers merely associate the plaintiff’s 
and defendant’s marks as sufficient evidence to show that the 
defendant’s mark “impairs the distinctiveness” of the plaintiff’s 
mark. And in certain leading cases, courts have based their finding 
 
 15 See Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub L No 109-312, 120 Stat 1730, 
codified in various sections of Title 15; Brian A. Jacobs, Trademark Dilution on the 
Constitutional Edge, 104 Colum L Rev 161, 168–71 (2004) (discussing the interpretive 
uncertainties of the repealed Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995). 
 16 See McCarthy, 4 McCarthy on Trademarks § 24:77 at 244–45 (cited in note 6). 
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of blurring on survey evidence showing a likelihood of consumer 
confusion as to source. In Part I.A, we review these forms of sur-
vey evidence and explain why, even on their own terms, they fail 
to establish blurring. We then present in Part I.B the results of 
a set of experiments that confirm the insufficiency of evidence of 
mere association. In Part I.C, we propose a means of empirically 
demonstrating impairment of distinctiveness. 
A. Survey Evidence of Mere Association 
Those courts that apply the mere association standard gen-
erally rely on two forms of survey evidence as proof of blurring. 
We review them in turn. 
1. The Nikepal survey approach. 
The first and most prominent form of survey evidence that 
mere association courts have accepted consists of variations on 
the survey method used by the plaintiff in Nike Inc v Nikepal 
International Inc.17 In Nikepal, the defendant used the mark 
NIKEPAL as the name of its business distributing glass syringes 
and other laboratory products.18 Nike conducted a telephone 
survey of the defendant’s current and prospective customers in 
which it asked them about “their perception of a website called 
nikepal.com.”19 Specifically, the survey asked: “What if anything, 
came to your mind when I first said the word Nikepal?” Unsur-
prisingly, 87 percent of respondents stated that they thought of 
the plaintiff or its products. The survey expert and the Nikepal 
court took this as evidence of blurring.20 Other courts have ac-
cepted the results of similar surveys as evidence of blurring.21 
The Nikepal court did not explain how mere association 
translates into evidence that use of NIKEPAL impairs the 
 
 17 84 USPQ2d 1820, 1824–25 (ED Cal 2007). 
 18 Id at 1822. 
 19 Id at 1824. 
 20 Id at 1825, 1828. 
 21 See, for example, Perfumebay.com Inc v eBay Inc, 506 F3d 1165, 1172 (9th Cir 
2007) (discussing a similar telephone survey asking respondents what website or company 
they would think of if they encountered the term “bay” used by a web site). See also Krista 
F. Holt and Scot A. Duvall, Chasing Moseley’s Ghost: Dilution Surveys under the Trademark 
Dilution Revision Act, 98 Trademark Rptr 1311, 1324–29 (2008) (reviewing survey evi-
dence of dilution considered by the federal courts in Nikepal and Perfumebay.com). But 
see Starbucks Corp v Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc, 736 F3d 198, 210–11 (2d Cir 2013) 
(finding a 3.1 percent response insufficient to prove actual association). 
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distinctiveness of the NIKE mark. Numerous trademark com-
mentators have criticized the Nikepal survey method as failing 
to present persuasive evidence of dilution,22 and we believe these 
criticisms are valid. Nike is one of the world’s best known brand 
names. The fact that a consumer thinks of a famous mark when 
she sees a word containing that mark may not mean that the 
distinctiveness of the famous mark is “blurred” or harmed in 
any way. Indeed, because the association calls the famous mark 
to mind, its strength and salience may conceivably be rein-
forced.23 Each time a Brooklynite goes into that Apple bar, she 
may be reminded that Apple, the iPhone maker, is a leading 
technology company. The measure used in the Nikepal case can-
not tell us which of the outcomes is more likely and, for that rea-
son, lacks construct validity; that is, it cannot be taken as a valid 
measure of harm. 
The marketing literature is very clear on how a brand suffers 
harm. Marketers would describe harm to a brand (or trademark) 
as a diminution of (customer-based) brand equity.24 Professor 
Kevin Lane Keller characterizes brand awareness and brand 
image as the components of customer-based brand equity.25 
Brand image in turn is built from strong, favorable, and unique 
brand associations. Damage caused by blurring conceptually fits 
into this framework as a weakening of brand associations, a 
compromise of the uniqueness of the associations, or a reduction 
in the favorability of the associations the trademark owner has 
worked hard to cultivate.26 The Nikepal approach cannot indicate 
 
 22 See, for example, Matthew D. Bunker and Kim Bissell, Lost in the Semiotic 
Maze: Empirical Approaches to Proof of Blurring in Trademark Dilution Law, 18 Comm 
L & Pol 375, 384 (2013) (“Aside from the problem of conflating association with dilution, 
the [Nike] survey certainly provides no evidence of dilutive harm since there is no base-
line measurement of the strength of Nike’s brand prior to Nikepal’s entry into the mar-
ketplace.”). 
 23 See Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F3d 252, 267 
(4th Cir 2007) (“[B]y making the famous mark an object of the parody, a successful parody 
might actually enhance the famous mark’s distinctiveness by making it an icon. The 
brunt of the joke becomes yet more famous.”). 
 24 See, for example, Kevin Lane Keller, Conceptualizing, Measuring, and Managing 
Customer-Based Brand Equity, 57 J Mktg 1, 8 (1993). 
 25 Kevin Lane Keller, Strategic Brand Management: Building, Measuring, and 
Managing Brand Equity 45–51 (Prentice Hall 2013). 
 26 This view follows the associative network theory of memory in psychology. See 
Allan M. Collins and Elizabeth F. Loftus, A Spreading-Activation Theory of Semantic 
Processing, 82 Psychological Rev 407, 408–09, 411–15 (1975). That theory models infor-
mation in (long-term) memory as networks of nodes connected by links. For an example 
of associative network theory applied in the trademark context, see Jacob Jacoby, The 
622 The University of Chicago Law Review [86:611 
 
that an association is tied to brand weakening and as such is not 
probative of blurring. 
2. Association and confusion survey results. 
Courts have also relied on likelihood of confusion surveys as 
evidence of dilution by blurring. For example, in Jada Toys, Inc 
v Mattel, Inc,27 Mattel, which manufactured toy automobiles un-
der the HOT WHEELS mark, argued that Jada Toys’s sale of 
toy automobiles under the HOT RIGZ mark would both confuse 
consumers and blur Mattel’s mark.28 Mattel proffered two confu-
sion surveys.29 The first exposed respondents to the HOT RIGZ 
mark and then asked a series of questions designed to determine 
who the respondents believed “puts out or makes” toy vehicles 
with that name.30 The second survey exposed respondents to a 
HOT RIGZ package and asked similar questions.31 In reversing 
the district court’s partial grant of summary judgment to Jada 
Toys, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals pointed to both surveys 
as “significant evidence of actual association between the alleged 
diluting mark and the famous mark”32 and found that a “reason-
able trier of fact could conclude that this evidence was sufficient 
to establish the existence of a likelihood of dilution.”33 The Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals has more recently written approvingly 
of the Jada Toys court’s reasoning and reliance on confusion 
survey evidence as potential evidence of dilution, stating that 
“[s]ource confusion may be probative of association.”34 
 
Psychological Foundations of Trademark Law: Secondary Meaning, Genericism, Fame, 
Confusion and Dilution, 91 Trademark Rptr 1013, 1018–24, 1046–50 (2001). Here, the 
nodes consist of trademarks and concepts linked to or associated with those marks. 
These concepts include product categories and attributes possessed. When exposed to a 
trademark, the network containing that trademark is activated and the activation signal 
spreads outward to the concepts linked to that node. Blurring presumes that that signal 
activates the node of the desired association more slowly, if at all. See id at 1046–50. 
 27 518 F3d 628 (9th Cir 2008). 
 28 Id at 631–32. 
 29 Id at 636. See also Holt and Duvall, 98 Trademark Rptr at 1332–35 (cited in note 
21) (discussing the Jada Toys surveys in detail). 
 30 Jada Toys, 518 F3d at 636. See also J. Thomas McCarthy, 6 McCarthy on 
Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 32:174 at 468–71 (cited in note 6) (describing the sur-
vey design used in Union Carbide Corp v Ever-Ready Inc, 531 F2d 366 (7th Cir 1976)). 
 31 Jada Toys, 518 F3d at 636. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Starbucks Corp, 736 F3d at 211 n 14. 
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As with the Nikepal survey format, consumer confusion sur-
veys show consumer association, but they do not show blurring. 
Indeed, confusion surveys arguably show the opposite of blur-
ring. Recall that blurring describes situations in which, due to 
the similarity of the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s marks, con-
sumers see the plaintiff’s mark and must think for a moment to 
determine whether the mark is referring to the plaintiff or the 
defendant—APPLE for the high-technology company or for the 
bar in Brooklyn. In this scenario, consumers are not confused as 
to source. They know that APPLE may refer to one of two differ-
ent companies. By contrast, consumer confusion surveys expose 
situations in which consumers believe that both marks, due to 
their close similarity, refer only to the plaintiff. In this sense, 
the defendant’s mark reminds consumers of and reinforces the 
link between the plaintiff’s mark and the plaintiff. Consumers 
do not think that there are two different companies. They think 
that there is only APPLE, the famous high-technology company 
that has now apparently expanded its brand into cocktail bars. 
In other words, in the case of consumer confusion, on en-
countering the defendant’s mark, the confused consumer associ-
ates it with the plaintiff’s mark and believes that it originates in 
the plaintiff. By contrast, in the case of blurring, on encounter-
ing the defendant’s mark, the blurred consumer associates it 
with the plaintiff’s mark but knows that it originates in the de-
fendant. Evidence of consumer association that leads to consumer 
confusion is evidence that consumers think there is only one 
company rather than two; those confused consumers cannot ex-
perience blurring because they associate both marks with the 
same company. 
On these grounds, many commentators have been critical of 
courts’ conflation of evidence of association that leads to confu-
sion with evidence of association that leads to blurring.35 This 
conflation risks merging confusion and dilution, which are two 
very different causes of action.36 Yet plaintiffs, it seems, are only 
 
 35 See, for example, McCarthy, 4 McCarthy on Trademarks § 24:116 at 392 (cited in 
note 6) (“The statutory [dilution] requirement of ‘association’ is not the same kind of mental 
link that must occur for classic trademark infringement by a likelihood of confusion.”). 
 36 Trademark confusion occurs when consumers are confused about the source of 
products or services because of similarity between two marks used on those products or 
services. Trademark dilution does not involve consumer confusion about the source of 
products or services. Trademark dilution refers to the use of a similar mark on products 
or services that are sufficiently different from the products or services marketed using 
the famous mark, such that there is no consumer confusion but the use weakens the 
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too eager to confuse the matter and, having conducted a confu-
sion survey, present its results as evidence of blurring as well. 
B. Survey Evidence of Mere Association Is Not Evidence of 
Impairment 
We believe, as the Moseley Court stated, that mere associa-
tion evidence fails on its own terms to establish blurring. But we 
also present experimental evidence confirming that even when 
consumers associate a junior mark with a senior famous mark, 
this does not necessarily result in weakening the association of 
the famous mark with its source or other associations. Further-
more, such consumer association does not necessarily result in 
any material change to consumers’ purchasing preferences. In 
sum, mere association on its own does not necessarily damage 
the senior mark. 
1. Brand selection pretest. 
Because we intended in these experiments to study blurring 
in the form of changes in brand associations, we sought out 
brands with strong, relatively well-defined associations. We 
chose automobiles as a product category and collected data from 
five hundred people to identify brands and associations that 
could potentially be blurred.37 The research began by showing 
respondents the names of up to twenty popular car brands. The 
brand names were shown one by one in random order. For each 
brand name, respondents were asked whether they were familiar 
with the brand. Familiarity with the brand was defined as know-
ing something about it other than that it exists. Respondents re-
sponded “yes” or “no.” 
As soon as a respondent identified five familiar brands, we 
stopped showing that respondent brands and moved on to the 
next phase. In this second phase, respondents were asked to 
name the top five things that came to mind when they thought 
of each of the brands they identified as familiar; that is, the top 
 
ability of a famous trademark to indicate the source of products or services, either by 
linking the mark to unsavory associations (tarnishing) or by linking it to product category 
or product attribute associations other than those possessed by the senior mark (blurring). 
See AutoZone, Inc v Tandy Corp, 373 F3d 786, 805 (6th Cir 2004); McCarthy, 4 McCarthy 
on Trademarks § 24:69 at 217–18, § 24:70 at 221, § 24:116 at 392 (cited in note 6). 
 37 We recruited subjects for our studies on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk platform. We 
discuss Mechanical Turk in Appendix A. 
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five associations for each brand. Our assumption was that very 
strong brands would bring to mind a relatively concentrated set 
of associations, most of which would be positive. Conversely, 
weaker brands would bring to mind a larger set of more diffuse, 
and sometimes negative, associations. 
To determine how concentrated a brand’s associations were, 
we collected all of the associations that respondents provided for 
each brand. We then grouped like associations and calculated 
the percentage of subjects identifying each group. We then added 
up the percentages for the five most common association groups 
mentioned for each brand. This gave us a concentration score. 
The mean concentration score was 39 percent. We considered a 
brand “strong” if its concentration score was at least one stand-
ard deviation above the mean. 
This left us with Mercedes (57.41 percent), BMW (55.92 per-
cent), and Infiniti (48.34 percent) as our three strongest brands. 
Coincidentally, all three brands are luxury car brands. Respond-
ents tended to emphasize this fact most when asked to list 
words they associate with each mark. In all three cases, the 
most common associations named were characteristics like “lux-
ury,” “expensive,” as well as words that connote wealth and high 
socioeconomic status. Respondents also associated words like 
“fast” and “good looking” with the Mercedes, BMW, and Infiniti 
brands, but to a lesser extent. 
We first selected MERCEDES because it had the highest 
concentration score. For our second test brand, we chose 
INFINITI. INFINITI had a relatively high concentration of posi-
tive associations, but it was among the least familiar brands in 
our sample. In fact, only 41.1 percent of respondents who saw an 
INFINITI prompt said they knew something about the brand 
other than that it existed. By comparison, 60.8 percent of re-
spondents who saw a MERCEDES prompt and 63.8 percent of 
respondents who saw a BMW prompt said that they knew some-
thing about those brands. As such, although INFINITI has rela-
tively clear associations among those who are familiar with it, it 
may be more easily diluted because its associations are not as 
widely held. 
2. Study 1: Examining brand association strength. 
Study 1 tested whether blurring advertisements affected the 
strength of the association between the MERCEDES and 
INFINITI brands and both their product category (cars) and the 
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top associations (wealth, luxury) previously found for each brand 
in our initial brand selection pretest. A total of 2,012 subjects 
participated in the experiment. Each subject was randomly as-
signed to a brand (MERCEDES or INFINITI), then randomly 
assigned to a treatment or control group. The 503 subjects in the 
INFINITI control group and the 506 subjects in the MERCEDES 
control group saw three “filler” text-only “tombstone” advertise-
ments for well-known brands (for example, PERRIER sparkling 
water, CHASE bank, UNITED VAN LINES) that contained true 
representations of each brand’s product category and attrib-
utes.38 Subjects in our two treatment groups saw the three filler 
ads plus an ad for a fictitious diluting brand. The 505 subjects 
assigned to the MERCEDES treatment group saw an ad for a di-
luting brand called “MERCEDES Toothpaste” and the 498 sub-
jects assigned to the INFINITI treatment group saw an ad for a 
diluting brand called “INFINITI Toothpaste.”39 
All subjects were then shown twenty-three brand-word pairs 
and told to state the degree to which they associate the brand 
name and the word on a five-point Likert scale,40 on which a 
score of one means they associate the brand and the word “a 
great deal” and a score of five means they associate the brand 
and the word “not at all.” Eighteen of these pairs were filler 
pairs for brands unrelated to cars, such as CHASE-money, 
CHASE-food, COCA COLA-thirst, COCA COLA-expensive, 
NIKE-slow, NIKE-poor, UNITED-plane, and UNITED-boxes. 
Randomly mixed in with the eighteen filler pairs were five 
brand-word pairs for one of our target marks. The pairs for our 
target marks included the product category “cars” and two 
words that capture the high-status qualities that respondents in 
our brand selection survey tended to associate with both marks: 
“luxury” and “wealth.” Finally, we included two words that are 
 
 38 A tombstone advertisement presents information via “black and white text only, 
with no use of human or animal images or cartoon characters.” Lawrence O. Gostin, 
Corporate Speech and the Constitution: The Deregulation of Tobacco Advertising, 92 Am 
J Pub Health 352, 354 (2002). 
 39 The tombstone advertisements used in the experiment are reproduced in Appendix B. 
 40 Likert scaling is a unidimensional multipoint scaling method that is commonly 
used to measure agreement with a proposition or (as in our experiment) the degree of 
association between two identified things or propositions. Unlike binary “yes or no” 
measures of agreement, Likert scales, which commonly measure agreement or associa-
tion along a five-point or seven-point scale, provide more information about the strength 
of the agreement or association that is being measured. See Donald R. Lehmann, Sunil 
Gupta, and Joel H. Steckel, Marketing Research 242 (Addison-Wesley 1998). 
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not associated with the Mercedes and Infiniti car brands: the 
product category “toothpaste” and the attribute “cheap.” Sub-
jects in the MERCEDES group therefore saw the pairs 
MERCEDES-cars, MERCEDES-wealth, MERCEDES-luxury, 
MERCEDES-toothpaste, and MERCEDES-cheap randomly dis-
tributed among the eighteen filler pairs. Subjects in the 
INFINITI group saw INFINITI-cars, INFINITI-wealth, 
INFINITI-luxury, INFINITI-toothpaste, and INFINITI-cheap 
mixed in with the eighteen filler pairs. 
If the MERCEDES and INFINITI Toothpaste ads were 
causing dilution by blurring, we would expect that subjects in 
the treatment groups exposed to such ads would show two dif-
ferences from subjects in the control group. First, as compared to 
control subjects, treatment subjects would more strongly associ-
ate the car brands with the product category “toothpaste.” Sec-
ond, treatment subjects would less strongly associate the car 
brands with the product category “cars.” They may also become 
less likely to associate these marks with words that our pretests 
indicated to be strongly associated with MERCEDES and 
INFINITI, such as “luxury” and “wealth,” and more likely to as-
sociate these brands with the word “cheap,” which better de-
scribes an ordinary, low-cost product like toothpaste than an ex-
pensive luxury automobile. Such differences would indicate that 
distinctiveness has been impaired. 
We present the results of Study 1 below. We first report aver-
age treatment effects (that is, the average of the Likert responses 
of the treatment subjects minus the average of the Likert re-
sponses of control subjects). These show no blurring. We then 
describe shifts in the distribution of responses of treatment sub-
jects as compared to control subjects. These results present a 
more complicated picture. 
a) Average treatment effects.  Table 1 sets out average 
treatment effects. These results show that our blurring stimulus 
produced a new association—that is, an association between 
MERCEDES or INFINITI, and toothpaste—for a significant 
number of subjects. Specifically, the average treatment effect of 
the diluting toothpaste ad was 0.369 on a five-point scale in the 
case of MERCEDES and 0.730 on a five-point scale in the case of 
INFINITI. Both effects are statistically significant (p < 0.01), 
and they remained significant in regressions that controlled for 
subjects’ stated level of familiarity with the MERCEDES and 
628 The University of Chicago Law Review [86:611 
 
INFINITI brands, which we asked about at the end of the 
interview. 
Crucially, Table 1 shows no evidence that this new associa-
tion between the test brands and the toothpaste product catego-
ry is accompanied by a weakening of the association between the 
test brands and their true product category or their principal 
product attributes. Subjects who saw the MERCEDES Toothpaste 
and INFINITI Toothpaste ads were no less likely than control 
group subjects to associate target marks with the product cate-
gory “cars” or attributes like “luxury” and “wealth.” Further-
more, subjects who saw the MERCEDES Toothpaste and 
INFINITI Toothpaste ads were no more likely than control 
group subjects to associate these brands with the word “cheap.” 
In short, Table 1 shows no evidence of distinctiveness having 
been impaired. 
TABLE 1:  LIKERT ASSOCIATION STRENGTH TESTS—DIFFERENCE 
BETWEEN TREATMENT GROUP MEAN AND CONTROL GROUP MEAN 
Treatment Group: Mercedes/Infiniti Toothpaste Ad 
Control Group: No Fourth Ad 











0.052 0.019 0.040 −0.369*** −0.016 
(0.050) (0.059) (0.040) (0.048) (0.032) 











−0.009 0.124 0.055 −0.730*** −0.029 
(0.078) (0.081) (0.075) (0.058) (0.043)      
Standard errors in parentheses 
Two-tailed test: ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
b) Shifts in distributions of Likert responses.  Looking only 
at average treatment effects can obscure important changes in 
the distribution of responses to each of the brand-word pairs. 
These distributions, presented in Figures 1 and 2, tell a more 
nuanced story. 
First, consistent with Table 1, the top-left and bottom-left 
cells of Figure 1 show that subjects who saw a MERCEDES 
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Toothpaste or INFINITI Toothpaste ad (the treatment groups) 
were more likely to associate these marks with the product cate-
gory “toothpaste” compared to control group subjects who did not 
see a diluting ad. Almost all control group subjects (94.0 percent 
and 95.7 percent) said they do “not at all” associate the 
INFINITI or MERCEDES brand with the word “toothpaste” 
(that is, they responded with a “five” on a five-point Likert rating 
scale). The result was very different for subjects in the treatment 
groups. In the INFINITI treatment group, 54.8 percent of sub-
jects said they do “not at all” associate INFINITI with the word 
“toothpaste,” whereas 23.5 percent said they associate these words 
“a little,” 9.2 percent “a moderate amount,” 6.2 percent “a lot,” 
and 6.2 percent “a great deal.” In the MERCEDES treatment 
group, 73.3 percent of subjects said they do “not at all” associate 
the words MERCEDES and toothpaste, whereas 15.8 percent 
associate them “a little,” 5.0 percent “a moderate amount,” 2.8 
percent “a lot,” and 3.2 percent “a great deal.” These differences 
ought to be attributable to the fact that treatment group sub-
jects saw an ad moments earlier that established an association 
between these brands and the toothpaste product category. 
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FIGURE 1:  DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES BY BRAND AND 
PRODUCT TYPE 
The top-right and bottom-right cells of Figure 1 show how 
subjects in the treatment and control groups responded when 
asked the degree to which they associate the MERCEDES and 
INFINITI brands with the product category “cars.” Here we see 
some evidence, although it is far from definitive, that the tooth-
paste ads weakened the association between the senior marks 
and their product category. In the case of MERCEDES, the more 
famous of our two brands, any impairment or weakening of the 
association with the product category appears to be negligible. 
Among control group subjects, for instance, 83.79 percent said 
they associate MERCEDES with the word “cars” “a great deal,” 
11.86 percent said they associate these words “a lot,” and 2.37 
percent said they associate them “a moderate amount.” In the 
treatment group, 81.19 percent said they associate MERCEDES 
with cars “a great deal,” 13.47 said “a lot,” and 3.56 percent said 
“a moderate amount.” In both groups, the association between 
MERCEDES and cars was very strong; however, it appears that 
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it was slightly less strong in the case of the treatment group. A 
chi-square test for equality of distributions indicates that these 
differences approach (but fall short of) standard thresholds for 
statistical significance (x2 = 9.22; p = 0.056). 
Evidence that the toothpaste ad caused a weakening of the 
association between the brand and product category is substan-
tively larger and statistically significant in the case of 
INFINITI, the lesser known of the two car brands. Among con-
trol group subjects, 58.65 percent said they associate INFINITI 
with the word “cars” “a great deal,” and 18.09 percent said they 
associate INFINITI with cars “a lot.” Among treatment group 
subjects, the percentage who said they associate INFINITI with 
cars “a great deal” was lower at 51.81 percent, while the per-
centage who said they associate INFINITI with cars “a lot” was 
higher at 25.1 percent. The distribution, in other words, shifts 
slightly to the right in the treatment group. A chi-square test 
indicates that these differences are statistically significant 
(x2 = 16.87; p = 0.002). Again, both groups strongly associate 
INFINITI with the word “cars”; however, the group that saw the 
INFINITI Toothpaste ad was somewhat less enthusiastic in 
making that connection. It therefore seems that the diluting ad 
caused a slight weakening of the association between INFINITI 
and cars. 
FIGURE 2:  DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES BY BRAND AND 
PRODUCT ATTRIBUTE 
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Figure 2 shows the distribution of responses to questions 
about product attributes, such as “wealth” and “luxury,” and the 
word “cheap,” which one might associate with an everyday product 
like toothpaste. These distributions show what looks like a slight 
weakening of the association on the MERCEDES-luxury and 
INFINITI-wealth pairs. These differences, however, are both sub-
stantively very small and not statistically significant (p = 0.211; 
p = 0.220). Overall, we do not find evidence that the toothpaste 
ad caused a weakening of common associations or that it caused 
people to associate the brand names with the word “cheap.”41 
*  *  * 
In sum, the MERCEDES and INFINITI Toothpaste ads con-
tributed to the formation of a new association between the targeted 
brands and a new product category. Evidence of this was straight-
forward both when we analyzed average treatment effects and 
when we compared the distribution of subjects’ responses. While 
we observed the formation of a new association among subjects 
in the treatment groups, we found mixed evidence that the crea-
tion of this new association was accompanied by the blurring or 
weakening of preexisting associations. Comparing average re-
sponses, there were no statistically significant differences between 
the degree to which subjects in the treatment and control groups 
associated certain words with the target brands. A closer look at 
the distribution of responses was more nuanced. Particularly 
with regard to the INFINITI-cars pairing, our analysis of the re-
sponse distributions indicates that the diluting ad may have 
caused a slight weakening of the association between INFINITI 
and cars. The data here is far from definitive—especially given 
the results of Study 2, which we discuss directly below. But it 
does point toward a method, which we term the association 
strength test, that courts can use to determine whether associa-
tion leads, in a particular case, to dilution. We will return to 
that point in Part I.C below. 
 41 A chi-square test indicates that there is a statistically significant difference be-
tween the distributions of the treatment and control groups on the MERCEDES-wealth 
pair (x2 = 27.07; p = 0.000). This difference, however, is not indicative of a weakening of 
the association between the MERCEDES brand and the word “wealth.” Rather, the dif-
ference between the two distributions appears to occur in the middle of the distribution 
in such a way that is not indicative of weakening or impairment. 
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3. Dilution and brand ranking.
Study 1 shows that new associations may or may not lead to 
the weakening of other associations, but the ultimate question 
as to whether distinctiveness is impaired is whether these new 
associations have some effect on the “selling power” of the fa-
mous brand. Study 2 engaged this issue. It tested whether os-
tensibly blurring advertisements and the new associations they 
produce affect consumer preferences and consumers’ intent to 
purchase the targeted brand. 
TABLE 2:  PREFERENCE RANKING EXPERIMENTS—DIFFERENCE 
BETWEEN TREATMENT GROUP MEAN AND CONTROL GROUP MEAN 
Treatment Group: Mercedes/Infiniti Toothpaste Ad 




Standard errors in parentheses 
Two-tailed test: ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Study 2 consisted of a preference-ordering protocol in which 
1,009 subjects were first shown up to twenty car brands in ran-
dom order and asked to state whether the brand was familiar. 
When five familiar brands were selected, respondents moved to 
the next stage of the experiment. Half of the subjects who said 
they were familiar with either MERCEDES or INFINITI were 
shown a diluting MERCEDES Toothpaste or INFINITI Toothpaste 
ad in addition to three filler ads (treatment group). The other 
half were shown a NIKE Toothpaste ad in addition to the three 
filler ads (control group).42 
After viewing the ads, subjects were asked to rank the five 
brands they had identified as familiar in order of preference, 
from 1 (favorite) to 5 (least favorite). Overall, the mean rank for 
MERCEDES was 2.32, and the mean rank for INFINITI was 2.84. 
 42 For reasons we explain more fully in the next Part, the control group was shown 
a toothpaste ad for a famous brand other than MERCEDES or INFINITI to ensure that 
control subjects were exposed to some ostensibly diluting advertisement, though one not 
directed at the targeted brands. 
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Table 2 shows the differences between the mean preference 
ranking for treatment and control group subjects for each brand. 
In both cases, the differences are not statistically different from 
zero. We are unable to find any evidence from this protocol that 
the diluting ad caused subjects to rank MERCEDES or 
INFINITI lower. 
C. Moving Forward: What Courts Should Require Dilution 
Plaintiffs to Prove 
To recall, federal trademark law states that “‘dilution by 
blurring’ is association arising from the similarity between a 
mark or trade name and a famous mark that impairs the dis-
tinctiveness of the famous mark.”43 This statutory language im-
plies that some associations do not impair the distinctiveness of 
the plaintiff’s mark. Otherwise, if all association resulted in im-
pairment, there would be no need to add the limiting phrase 
“that impairs the distinctiveness of the famous mark.” The stat-
utory scheme assumes an underlying fact: association does not 
necessarily lead to impairment. 
Taken together, Studies 1 and 2 suggest that courts that 
equate mere association with impairment—in defiance of the 
Moseley Court’s dictum—are proceeding in error. We exposed 
subjects to diluting stimuli that created new associations among 
the targeted brands and new products and brand characteristics 
in these subjects’ shared associative memory networks.44 But de-
spite the new associations, we found no evidence of blurring 
measured either by average treatment effects or by effects on 
purchase intention. That is, as measured by average treatment 
effects, subjects showed no weakening of the association be-
tween the targeted brands and their traditional products and 
characteristics, nor did these subjects reveal any change in pur-
chasing preferences. 
In contrast, when we disaggregated average treatment ef-
fects and examined the distribution of responses on our five-
point Likert scale, we saw some results that suggest the poten-
tial for dilution. For example, we saw a statistically significant 
shift in the number of subjects responding “a great deal” when 
asked whether they associated INFINITI with the product cate-
gory “cars” and a corresponding increase in subjects responding 
43 15 USC § 1125(c)(2)(B) (emphasis added). 
44 See generally Collins and Loftus, 82 Psychological Rev 407 (cited in note 26). 
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“a lot” to that question (a response indicating a slightly weaker 
connection). On the other hand, we did not see the same sort of 
significant shift in the distribution of preferences for 
MERCEDES. That fact is important because even our best evi-
dence for impairment is significant for only one of the two 
brands. What we see, in short, is a glimmer of evidence that as-
sociation may be associated with dilution. But we see strong ev-
idence that association does not lead inexorably to dilution. 
On this basis, we conclude that courts should not treat mere 
association as tantamount to proof of trademark dilution 
through blurring. Plaintiffs must present something more than 
evidence of association between the defendant’s and plaintiff’s 
marks to establish the likelihood that the plaintiff’s mark will 
suffer dilution via blurring. 
The question, of course, is what plaintiffs should do to pre-
sent proof of dilution aside from evidence of the mere fact of as-
sociation between the defendant’s and plaintiff’s marks. We be-
lieve that our results help to mark the correct path. Courts 
should require plaintiffs to produce evidence of a weakening of 
the associations between the plaintiff’s mark and its source or 
other preexisting attributes. Plaintiffs may seek to do so by us-
ing our Study 1 and Study 2 methodologies. Study 1 is a direct 
measure of any such impairment. Data from this type of study 
should be analyzed to see both whether exposure creates a nega-
tive average treatment effect and also whether it changes the 
distribution of Likert responses in a way that suggests impair-
ment. As a supplement, Study 2 indirectly measures association 
strength. It does so by inquiring whether the association of a de-
fendant’s junior mark with the plaintiff’s senior mark “cashes 
out” in the form of reduced consumer intention to purchase the 
plaintiff’s goods. In the end, this is the form of harm that brand 
owners typically care about most because it hits their bottom 
line. Though the results of one test may sometimes be sufficient 
to show impairment, courts would be best advised to rely on a 
combination of these tests and to be wary of enjoining defend-
ants based on weak and conflicting evidence of dilution—such as 
when (as in our studies) the data reveals no substantial negative 
average treatment effect or diminution in purchase intention 
but rather only small shifts in the distribution of Likert re-
sponses. Ultimately, the plaintiff should be required to demon-
strate that any weakening of association between the plaintiff’s 
mark and its source or preexisting attributes (or any reduction 
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in purchase intention) is not just statistically significant but also 
substantively significant. Evidence that the defendant’s mark 
only slightly impairs the distinctiveness of the plaintiff’s mark 
cannot justify the kind of broad injunctive relief that antidilu-
tion protection entails. 
In sum, we have identified empirical tests for dilution that 
have construct validity. And yet nothing we have done relieves 
courts of their central responsibility in assessing this sort of so-
cial scientific evidence—a court must always take care to assess 
the strength of the evidence produced by the tests and not simply 
rely blindly on a positive and statistically significant result. 
II. RESPONSE TIME EXPERIMENTS AND BLURRING
The association tests we discuss above are not the only tools 
available to litigants and courts involved in a dilution dispute. 
Over the last two decades, social science research has developed 
tests for blurring based on response time measurements, and 
these tests have begun to penetrate ongoing litigations. Unlike 
mere association surveys, response time tests purportedly show 
disassociation in that subjects exposed to ostensibly diluting 
stimuli appear to take longer than control subjects to link tar-
geted marks with their traditional product categories and prod-
uct attributes and characteristics. In this Part, however, we 
show that previous versions of these tests were flawed. When 
response time tests use the proper control, no evidence of dilu-
tion is found. We first review these previous experiments. We 
then report the results of our own response time experiments 
and explain their significance. 
A. Previous Response Time Experiments 
We focus on two response time studies: Professors Maureen 
Morrin and Jacob Jacoby’s pathbreaking 2000 study, Trademark 
Dilution: Empirical Measures for an Elusive Concept,45 and 
Professors Chris Pullig, Carolyn Simmons, and Richard 
Netemeyer’s influential 2006 study, Brand Dilution: When Do 
New Brands Hurt Existing Brands?46 
45 Morrin and Jacoby, 19 J Pub Pol & Mktg at 265 (cited in note 14). 
 46 Pullig, Simmons, and Netemeyer, 70 J Mtkg at 52 (cited in note 14). For other 
dilution experiments, see generally Maureen Morrin, Jonathan Lee, and Greg M. Allenby, 
Determinants of Trademark Dilution, 33 J Consumer Rsrch 248 (2006); Hannelie Kruger 
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1. Morrin and Jacoby.
Morrin and Jacoby set out to test the hypothesis that 
“[c]onsumers exposed to trademark-diluting advertisements will 
(a) commit more brand recognition errors and (b) exhibit slower 
brand recognition reaction times than will consumers not ex-
posed to such advertisements.”47 Their method was straightfor-
ward (and served as a model for our own Pilot Studies A and B 
and Study 3, all discussed below). They exposed sixty-four sub-
jects each to a total of six “tombstone” text advertisements, some 
of which were ostensibly diluting of three target brands 
(HEINEKEN, HYATT, and GODIVA) and then recorded the speed 
and accuracy with which the subjects attempted to match the 
target brands with their product categories and characteristics.48 
The treatment group consisted of thirty-three subjects who 
viewed three text-only “filler” advertisements for well-known 
brands that contained true representations of each brand’s product 
category and attributes (for CHASE, KODAK, and PERRIER), 
one blurring advertisement, one tarnishing advertisement,49 and 
one brand extension advertisement.50 The blurring advertise-
ment took the form of an advertisement for either HEINEKEN 
popcorn or HYATT legal services. Each blurring advertisement 
contained a disclaimer stating either that “[HEINEKEN] pop-
corn is NOT associated with the makers of Heineken beer” or 
that “[HYATT] legal services is NOT associated with Hyatt Hotels, 
Inc.”51 The tarnishing advertisement was for DOGIVA dog biscuits 
and contained no disclaimer with respect to GODIVA. The brand 
extension advertisement was for either HEINEKEN popcorn or 
and Christo Boshoff, The Influence of Trademark Dilution on Brand Attitude: An Empir-
ical Investigation, 24 Mgmt Dynamics 50 (2015). 
47 Morrin and Jacoby, 19 J Pub Pol & Mktg at 268 (cited in note 14). 
48 Id at 268–70. 
49 Though Morrin and Jacoby focused their study on dilution by blurring, they also 
tested for dilution by tarnishment. Id at 267–68. A senior trademark is tarnished when a 
junior mark portrays the senior mark in a negative light—for example, by associating it 
with illegal activities or sexually suggestive messages. The theory underlying liability for 
dilution by tarnishment is that, even in the absence of confusion regarding the source of 
the senior mark owner’s products, the selling power of the senior mark may be harmed 
by the unsavory association. See McCarthy, 4 McCarthy on Trademarks § 24:70 at 221 
(cited in note 6). 
 50 A brand extension advertisement is an advertisement suggesting that the tar-
geted brand was extending its reach into a product category different from the one with 
which it had been traditionally associated by consumers. See Morrin and Jacoby, 19 J 
Pub Pol & Mktg at 266–67 (cited in note 14). 
51 Id at 275. 
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HYATT legal services—whichever was not used in the blurring 
advertisement—and apparently contained language announcing 
the brand extension.52 
One control group consisted of sixteen subjects who were 
exposed to the three filler advertisements and to three unrelated 
advertisements. A second control group consisted of fifteen sub-
jects who were exposed to the three filler advertisements and 
three reinforcing advertisements for HEINEKEN beer, HYATT 
hotels, and GODIVA chocolate.53 
Immediately after viewing the six advertisements, subjects 
engaged in a computer task in which two words appeared sequen-
tially on a screen. Subjects were instructed to indicate as quickly 
but as accurately as possible whether the two words “represent-
ed a match” by hitting one key for “Yes” or another for “No.”54 
Among the word pairs presented were pairs relating to category 
membership (for example, GODIVA/chocolates, chocolates/ 
GODIVA) and attribute possession (for example, GODIVA/rich 
taste, rich taste/GODIVA).55 
Morrin and Jacoby reported that the mean response times 
of the treatment group were significantly higher than those of 
either control group, but only with respect to matches relating to 
HEINEKEN and GODIVA and not with respect to matches re-
lating to HYATT. For matches relating to HEINEKEN and 
GODIVA taken together, treatment subjects’ mean response 
time was 836 milliseconds while it was 672 milliseconds for the 
control group exposed to reinforcing advertisements and 713 
milliseconds for the control group exposed to unrelated adver-
tisements.56 Meanwhile, for matches relating to HYATT, the 
treatment group’s mean response time was 680 milliseconds, 
which was exactly the same as the reinforced control group’s 
mean response time and substantially less than the unrein-
forced control group’s mean response time of 810 milliseconds.57 
Morrin and Jacoby further reported that the treatment group’s 
matching accuracy was lower than both control groups and that 
52 Id at 268. 
53 Id. 




2019] Testing for Trademark Dilution in Court and the Lab 639 
this difference was statistically significant.58 Specifically, the 
treatment group accurately judged 73.1 percent of the matches, 
while the unreinforced control group and the reinforced control 
group accurately judged 84.3 percent and 88.9 percent of the 
matches, respectively.59 
As Morrin and Jacoby saw it, these results fully supported 
the hypothesis that consumers exposed to diluting advertise-
ments will commit more brand recognition errors but only par-
tially supported the hypothesis that such consumers will react 
more slowly to brand recognition tasks. They speculated that 
subjects’ increased familiarity with the HYATT brand moderated 
the effect on response times for the HYATT legal services adver-
tisement. The authors conducted a subsequent study that tested 
consumers’ ability after exposure to diluting stimuli to recall the 
categories of goods in connection with which certain brands were 
used.60 The study tested both well-known and unknown brands. 
Based on the results of this study, Morrin and Jacoby concluded, 
“It appears that very strong brands are immune to dilution be-
cause their memory connections are so strong that it is difficult 
for consumers to alter them or create new ones with the same 
brand name.”61 This conclusion, if correct, carries with it signifi-
cant public policy implications because federal antidilution law 
is designed to protect only “famous” brands (that is, those that 
are “widely recognized by the general consuming public of the 
United States”).62 
2. Pullig, Simmons, and Netemeyer.
Now armed with a methodological paradigm, subsequent re-
sponse time research addressed the next logical question: Under 
 58 Morrin and Jacoby, 19 J Pub Pol & Mktg at 269 (cited in note 14). Morrin and 
Jacoby found statistically significant lower matching accuracy only when they measured 
the control group against the three brands pooled together. When they measured the 
control group against the brands individually, the accuracy of the treatment group was 
still lower, but the difference was not significant. Id. 
 59 Id. Morrin and Jacoby’s results on recognition accuracy do not detail the associa-
tions that they examine apart from brand category (for example, GODIVA chocolate). 
See id. As such, it is difficult to know what “accuracy” means. Finally, the numbers pre-
sented in their Table 1 (top panel) are inconsistent. Id. Unlike the bottom panel of the 
table, the mean row is not equal to the mean of the rows. Therefore, we find it difficult to 
interpret or accept the findings. 
60 Id at 270–74. 
61 Id at 274. 
62 15 USC § 1125(c)(2)(A). 
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what conditions would we expect dilution to be more likely to oc-
cur? Pullig, Simmons, and Netemeyer built on the Morrin and 
Jacoby approach to address this question by investigating poten-
tial moderators of trademark dilution.63 In particular, they were 
interested in whether the similarity between the categories and 
attributes of the senior and junior users moderated the threat of 
dilution by blurring. 
Pullig, Simmons, and Netemeyer’s experimental protocol 
was complex and need not be described in detail here. In es-
sence, they focused on BIG RED, a brand of chewing gum rea-
sonably well-known in the United States for having a cinnamon 
flavor, and used a hypothetical BRAND A as a control. To study 
the effect of category similarity, they exposed eighty-nine subjects 
to a total of three advertisements according to a “2 (category 
similarity: high [bubble gum] or low [snack bars]) x 2 (new 
product: junior brand [BIG RED] and unbranded 
[BRAND A]) x 2 (order of ad presentation) between-subjects de-
sign.”64 More specifically, one advertisement was for bubble gum 
(branded as either BIG RED, BRAND A, or BAZOOKA), one was 
for bite-size candy (branded as SKITTLES), and one for snack 
bars (branded as either BIG RED, BRAND A, or NUTRI-
GRAIN). Each advertisement contained the brand name, a 
product category, and two claims. To hold constant attribute 
similarity, certain bubble gum and snack bar ads claimed “great 
cinnamon flavor.”65 The BIG RED bubble gum advertisement also 
promised to “blow awesome bubbles,” while for the BIG RED 
snack bars advertisement, the other claim stated “enriched with 
vitamins and minerals.”66 
After viewing the advertisements, subjects engaged in a 
computer-administered task. The subject was presented with a 
brand name or attribute, and after pressing the space bar, an at-
tribute or brand name (depending on what was presented first) 
appeared. The subject then pressed a key as quickly but as accu-
rately as possible to indicate whether the brand name and at-
tribute matched.67 
Pullig, Simmons, and Netemeyer reported that subjects ex-
posed to the use of BIG RED in the similar product category 
63 See Pullig, Simmons, and Netemeyer, 70 J Mtkg at 55, 58–60 (cited in note 14). 
64 Id at 55–57 (alterations in original). 
65 Id at 57. 
66 Id. 
67 Pullig, Simmons, and Netemeyer, 70 J Mtkg at 57 (cited in note 14). 
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(bubble gum) exhibited significantly faster response times link-
ing BIG RED and chewing gum and linking BIG RED and cin-
namon flavor than subjects exposed to BRAND A bubble gum. 
The mean change in speed ranged from an increase of 174 milli-
seconds to an increase of 327 milliseconds. These results sug-
gested that junior users in a similar product category reinforce 
rather than blur the senior mark.68 
By contrast, subjects exposed to the use of BIG RED in the 
different product category (snack bars) exhibited significantly 
slower response times than subjects exposed to BRAND A snack 
bars. Here the mean change ranged from a decrease of 119 mil-
liseconds to a decrease of 334 milliseconds. These results sug-
gested to the authors that junior users in a different product 
category blur the mark.69 
In a second study, Pullig, Simmons, and Netemeyer manip-
ulated both category and attribute similarity. Their protocol was 
based on that of the previous study but with an additional di-
mension varying attribute similarity between high, “cinnamon 
flavor and breath freshening,” and low, “strawberry flavor and 
containing immunity-boosting Echinacea.”70 Their response time 
results suggested to them that a junior user in a similar product 
category with similar product attributes reinforces the senior 
user’s mark. On the other hand, a junior user in a different 
product category with different attributes blurs the senior mark. 
However, the response time results were otherwise mixed and 
suggest that attribute similarity may sometimes offset category 
dissimilarity and forestall blurring.71 
B. Response Time Pilot Studies: Are We Really Observing 
Dilution? 
A leading criticism of the Morrin and Jacoby study in particu-
lar, and to some extent of the Pullig, Simmons, and Netemeyer 
study, is that they failed to place their test subjects in a pur-
chasing context. Professor Rebecca Tushnet has persuasively ar-
gued that consumers are sophisticated enough to disambiguate 
68 Id at 58. 
69 Id. 
70 Id at 58–59. 
71 Pullig, Simmons, and Netemeyer, 70 J Mtkg at 60–61 (cited in note 14). 
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terms in light of context.72 For example, at an airport, when 
someone refers to “United” or “Delta,” no one must “think for a 
moment” to know that the references are to airlines and not to 
the Manchester soccer club or the faucet maker. Even in a set-
ting like online search, in which there is less context, consumers 
are often able to disambiguate various uses of a mark using the 
information that accompanies search results. 
Pictured above, for example, are results from a Google 
search for “Delta.” Using the search test, one can clearly differ-
entiate the airline from the faucet maker. 
Blurring, in other words, is possible in theory but rarely if 
ever likely in practice because of the disambiguating effect of 
purchasing context. We initially set out to determine whether 
placing treatment and control subjects in a purchasing context 
would affect the comparative speed and accuracy with which 
they link marks with their sources and associations. What we 
found led us to recognize that the basic design of previous re-
sponse time studies was flawed. 
 72 Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive Science, 
86 Tex L Rev 507, 529–32 (2008). 
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1. Pilot Study A: The surprise effect. 
We began our response time study by conducting a small-
sample pilot to pretest our survey instrument. The objective of 
this pilot was to measure the speed and accuracy with which 
subjects identified whether the terms MERCEDES-cars and 
INFINITI-cars are a match. One hundred subjects were randomly 
assigned to a mark—either MERCEDES or INFINITI—and 
then to one of three conditions within each mark. Each mark-
condition combination had between fifteen and seventeen re-
spondents. The pilot protocol initially followed the method that 
we used in Study 1. Subjects in the control condition saw the 
three filler text-only “tombstone” advertisements for well-known 
brands (PERRIER sparkling water, CHASE bank, UNITED 
VAN LINES), while subjects in our two treatment groups saw 
the three filler ads plus either the ad for MERCEDES Toothpaste 
or the ad for INFINITI Toothpaste. 
After looking at the ads, subjects in one of the treatment 
groups participated in a brief car buying role-play task—that is, 
a task related to the targeted brands and intended to contextu-
alize the matching task. These subjects were asked to write 
about the steps they would take in the process of purchasing a 
car, to think about how many dealerships they would visit, and 
to rank various features such as speed, roominess, and afforda-
bility. Subjects in the control group and the other treatment 
group performed a similar task after seeing the ads, but instead 
of being asked to imagine the process of buying a car, they were 
asked to imagine the process of searching for a job—a process 
unrelated to the targeted marks. In addition to allowing us the 
opportunity to expose some subjects to a purchasing context, 
these exercises served as distractors between the ads and the 
response time portion of the study.73 And if relevant context as-
sists consumers in disambiguating the marks, we should see 
less, or no, response time delays for our subjects who were ex-
posed to the car buying context (relevant to the targeted marks) 
versus subjects exposed to the job search context (irrelevant to 
the targeted marks). 
In the response time portion of the protocol, which came 
next, all subjects were informed that they would see a brand 
 
 73 Distractor tasks were also used in Morrin and Jacoby’s response time study. 
Morrin and Jacoby, 19 J Pub Pol & Mktg at 272 (cited in note 14). 
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name and a word on the following screens. Subjects were told to 
click a “Yes” button if the mark and the word matched and to 
click a “No” button if they did not. Subjects were asked to click 
as quickly as possible without sacrificing accuracy. 
Subjects were then shown thirty brand-mark pairs. Twenty-
five of these were “filler” pairs for marks such as 
MCDONALD’S, CHASE, COCA COLA, PERRIER, 
MICROSOFT, and UNITED. Mixed in with the filler pairs were 
pairs for one of our target marks, either MERCEDES or 
INFINITI. These pairs included the product category “cars” and 
two  product attributes strongly associated with each mark in 
the Brand Selection Pretest (that is, “wealth” and “luxury” in 
the case of Mercedes; “fast” and “luxury” in the case of Infiniti). 
As in our association studies (Studies 1 and 2, described above), 
we also included a product attribute that is not strongly associ-
ated with either mark (“cheap”) and a product category that is 
unrelated to cars (“printers”). Subjects in the MERCEDES group 
therefore saw MERCEDES-cars, MERCEDES-wealth, 
MERCEDES-luxury, MERCEDES-printers, and MERCEDES-
cheap mixed in with the twenty-five filler pairs. Subjects in the 
INFINITI group saw INFINITI-cars, INFINITI-fast, INFINITI-
luxury, INFINITI-printers, and INFINITI-cheap mixed in with 
the twenty-five filler pairs. Through Qualtrics, we were able to 
measure the time it took each subject to click “Yes” or “No,” 
down to one one-thousandth of a second.74 
When we compared average response times, our results for 
the MERCEDES group matched what others have found before: 
subjects who saw a diluting MERCEDES Toothpaste ad were 
slightly slower (by about two-tenths of a second) than control 
subjects to respond when the pair MERCEDES-cars flashed onto 
the screen. That delay was statistically significant (differ-
ence = 0.194 seconds; p < 0.05). Subjects who saw the 
MERCEDES Toothpaste ad were also slower to respond when 
the pairs MERCEDES-printers (difference = 0.183; p < 0.05) and 
MERCEDES-wealth (difference = 0.345; p < 0.05) appeared on 
screen. We saw no such differences for the INFINITI pairs. 
But we also noticed something that we did not expect. In 
addition to a statistically significant difference in average re-
sponse time between treatment and control groups on the 
MERCEDES-cars, MERCEDES-printers, and MERCEDES-
 
 74 For a more detailed description of the procedure, see Appendix A. 
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wealth pairs, we noticed statistically significant differences be-
tween control and treatment groups on many of the filler pairs. 
Subjects in the MERCEDES treatment groups, for example, 
were slightly slower to click “Yes” or “No” when pairs like 
MCDONALD’S-hamburgers (difference = 0.378; p < 0.01), 
MCDONALD’S-affordable (difference = 0.203; p < 0.05), 
MCDONALD’S-healthy (difference = 0.251; p < 0.05), 
MICROSOFT-software (difference = 0.234; p < 0.05), COCA 
COLA-expensive (difference = 0.211; p < 0.05), and UNITED-
boxes (difference = 0.416; p < 0.05) appeared on screen. 
The fact that our MERCEDES Toothpaste ad led to slower 
response times, not only for the MERCEDES-cars pair but for a 
total of sixteen mark-word pairs completely unrelated to the 
MERCEDES mark, gave us pause and caused us to question 
what these response time experiments are actually measuring. 
Were we measuring dilution of the MERCEDES and INFINITI 
marks? Or was the diluting ad so unexpected by subjects that it 
distracted or surprised them and either caused them to suspect 
that experimenters were trying to trick them or simply diverted 
their attention from the task at hand? The latter would merely 
be an experimental artifact that could not be construed as harming 
the mark. We designed a second pilot to examine these issues. 
2. Pilot Study B: Controlling for potential surprise. 
Our first pilot led us to hypothesize that an unexpected or 
surprising stimulus could give subjects pause as they proceed 
through the experimental task, resulting in slower response 
times in general, even for marks included in the task that the 
stimulus did not target. If this were the case, differences in re-
sponse times between treatment and control groups would not 
be a sign of dilution but rather an artifact of an experimental 
design that fails to properly control for the potentially distract-
ing effects of any unexpected stimulus. Studies reported in the 
psychology and consumer studies literature support this under-
standing.75 Accordingly, we designed a second pilot to isolate 
this potential source of methodological error. 
 
 75 While no one in the trademark literature had contemplated a surprise effect for 
such incongruent ads, this effect is consistent with prior work on response times and 
matching tasks. The psychology literature is replete with studies of perceptual and cog-
nitive matching tasks. See generally, for example, Robert W. Proctor, A Unified Theory 
for Matching-Task Phenomena, 88 Psychological Rev 291 (1981). Such tasks generally 
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Pilot B was virtually identical in structure to Pilot A except 
that the protocol attempted to control for any unexpected stimulus. 
Again, we administered the study to one hundred subjects. The 
treatment groups were the same as in Pilot A. The sample sizes 
for the mark-treatment combinations ranged between fifteen 
and eighteen per group. Now, however, our control group sub-
jects would see an ad for a fictitious NIKE Toothpaste in addi-
tion to the three filler ads. Our logic was that if our 
MERCEDES/INFINITI Toothpaste ads were causing subjects to 
slow down on the matching exercise simply because they were 
unexpected, that effect could be offset by including an ad that 
was just as unexpected in the control group; that is, we would 
add a control ad to the control group. Statistically significant dif-
ferences between treatment groups and the control group, in 
other words, should diminish or vanish if a surprise-type effect 
is at work. 
When we compared average response times for the treat-
ment and control groups, we found that this is exactly what 
happened. Virtually no statistically significant differences in re-
sponse times for the MERCEDES pairs, the INFINITI pairs, or 
the filler pairs appeared in Pilot B. Across all groups and marks, 
there were twenty-nine statistically significant delays in Pilot A 
and only four statistically significant delays in Pilot B. There 
 
involve either simultaneous or sequential presentation of stimuli (for example, letters, 
numbers, words) that subjects judge to be the same or different according to criteria set 
by the experimenter. 
 One branch of this extensive literature involves priming. In these studies, a priming 
stimulus, to which the subject generally does not have to react, is presented prior to an-
other stimulus to which the subject generally does have to react. A neutral prime condi-
tion serves as a baseline against which a particular type of prime produces facilitation or 
inhibition in processing a test stimulus. See Proctor, 88 Psychological Rev at 293 (cited 
in note 75). The pilot studies reported in this Article as well as in the prior trademark 
dilution literature reviewed earlier all fall into this category. 
 Delays in response time are often evident when the prime is unrelated to the subsequent 
stimulus, a concept termed prime validity. James H. Neeley, Semantic Priming and 
Retrieval from Lexical Memory: Roles of Inhibitionless Spreading Activation and Limited-
Capacity Attention, 106 J Experimental Psychology: Gen 226, 230, 251–52 (1977); David 
A. Taylor, Time Course of Context Effects, 106 J Experimental Psychology: Gen 404, 421–
23 (1977); Michael I. Posner and Charles R.R. Snyder, Facilitation and Inhibition in the 
Processing of Signals, in P.M.A. Rabbitt and S. Dornic, eds, Attention and Performance V 
669, 670–71 (Academic 1975). The general consensus in this literature is that the delay 
can be attributed to both automatic and attentional components. In other words, some 
effects occur automatically as a result of processing the prime, and others involve the 
subject’s conscious expectations. Proctor, 88 Psychological Rev at 294 (cited in note 75); 
Ira Fischler, Associative Facilitation without Expectancy in a Lexical Decision Task, 3 
Experimental Psychology Human Perception and Performance 18, 18 (1977). 
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were six significant delays on the MERCEDES matches in Pilot A, 
none in Pilot B, and none for INFINITI in either study. Also, 
comparison across treatments revealed no effect of context. 
The results of our first two pilots led us to question the va-
lidity of using the traditional response time experiments to 
measure dilution. Whereas before we assumed that response 
time experiments were a valid way to measure dilution, we now 
believe that statistically significant results in the prior Morrin 
and Jacoby and Pullig, Simmons, and Netemeyer experiments 
could have been due to failure to control for the surprise effect 
caused by the supposedly diluting ad. It could be that the mere 
presence of any unexpected mark-category combination in an ad 
slows down processing because the consumer is busy wondering 
what was behind the surprising stimulus. But because the small 
subject pool for our pilot response time studies increased the 
risk of spurious results, we decided to run our redesigned control 
condition with a large sample to confirm our suspicions. Accord-
ingly, we designed a larger-scale experiment to more formally 
test the extent to which response time experiments measure di-
lution versus the effect of the unexpected. Because we found no 
indication that our context manipulation had any effect in either 
of our two pilots, we focused exclusively on the element of the 
unexpected. 
C. Study 3: Response Time and Category Recall When 
Controlling for Surprise 
We proceeded with a larger-scale study (N = 1,343) to disen-
tangle the two possible causes for the observed reaction times in 
our two pilot studies. We randomly assigned subjects to a 
MERCEDES group or an INFINITI group. For each targeted 
mark, subjects were randomly assigned to one of three groups: a 
treatment group or one of two control groups. Subjects in the 
treatment group saw the three filler ads plus a MERCEDES- or 
INFINITI-diluting ad (N = 444). Subjects in the first control 
group saw only the three filler ads (N = 451), and subjects in the 
second control group saw the three filler ads plus a NIKE 
Toothpaste ad (N = 448). After viewing the ads, subjects partici-
pated in the job search role-play task as a distractor. They then 
answered the same thirty matching questions we presented in 
the first two studies. 
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1. Response times. 
Our results indicate that once we control for the effect of any 
surprising mark-category combination, evidence of blurring disap-
pears. In other words, with respect to the average response times 
in which subjects link MERCEDES and INFINITI with their tradi-
tional associations, there are no significant differences between 
subjects exposed to ostensibly blurring ads involving the targeted 
marks (MERCEDES Toothpaste and INFINITI Toothpaste) and 
subjects exposed to ostensibly blurring ads involving a mark 
other than the targeted marks (NIKE Toothpaste). 
Consider first Table 3A. This table reports the average 
treatment effects (that is, the average response time of the 
treatment group minus the average response time of the control 
group) for MERCEDES treatment subjects (who were exposed to 
the three filler ads and the MERCEDES Toothpaste ad) and 
control subjects within the first control group (who were exposed 
to the three filler ads only). In the first row, there is no statisti-
cally significant difference between the treatment and control 
groups on the product-category pair MERCEDES-cars, which 
indicates that the diluting stimulus was not causing subjects to 
dissociate the brand MERCEDES from its traditional product 
category. We do see, however, what could be interpreted as a form 
of blurring of the association between MERCEDES and “luxury.” 
On average, subjects who saw the MERCEDES Toothpaste ad 
took 0.075 seconds longer than subjects in the control group to 
determine whether MERCEDES and LUXURY match (p < 0.05). 
Although this difference is statistically significant, it is substan-
tively very small. Furthermore, no other differences for the tar-
get MERCEDES brand are statistically significant from zero. 
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TABLE 3A:  DIFFERENCES IN MEAN RESPONSE TIMES—TARGET 
BRAND: MERCEDES—NO CONTROL FOR SURPRISE 
Treatment Group: Mercedes Toothpaste Ad 
Control Group: No Fourth Ad 












0.075** 0.023 −0.046 0.092 0.063 












0.025 0.037 −0.005 0.007 0.098** 











0.064 −0.008 0.067 0.060 0.042 











0.020 −0.038 0.164** −0.012 0.024 
(0.064) (0.057) (0.077) (0.098) (0.061) 











−0.021 −0.121 −0.071 0.041 −0.039 











0.019 −0.010 0.111 −0.077 0.080 
(0.068) (0.070) (0.075) (0.087) (0.082) 
          
Standard errors in parentheses 
Two-tailed test: ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Table 3A further indicates that the diluting stimulus is as-
sociated with slower response times on two unrelated brands. 
Treatment group participants, for example, were slower by 
0.098 seconds to react to the COCA COLA-sour pair and by 
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0.164 to the MICROSOFT-computer pair. This signals that the 
MERCEDES Toothpaste ad may have been unexpected by 
treatment subjects and may have slowed them down generally. 
TABLE 3B:  DIFFERENCES IN MEAN RESPONSE TIMES—TARGET 
BRAND: MERCEDES—CONTROLLING FOR SURPRISE 
Treatment Group: Mercedes Toothpaste Ad 
Control Group: Nike Toothpaste Ad 












−0.026 −0.096 0.022 0.047 0.083 












−0.014 0.029 −0.098 −0.066 0.032 











0.060 0.006 0.015 0.117** −0.017 











0.049 −0.079 0.104 −0.010 0.036 











−0.083 0.025 0.017 0.120 −0.033 











0.091 0.023 0.029 −0.012 0.021 
(0.065) (0.062) (0.080) (0.066) (0.089)      
Standard errors in parentheses 
Two-tailed test: ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 3B shows what happens when we control for the ap-
pearance of a surprising mark-category combination. It reports 
the average treatment effects for MERCEDES treatment subjects 
and control subjects within the second control group (who were 
exposed to the three filler ads and the Nike Toothpaste ad). The 
statistically significant differences that we saw in Table 3A dis-
appear, not simply with respect to MERCEDES-luxury but also 
with respect to COCA-COLA-sour and MICROSOFT-computers. 
Only one statistically significant response time difference re-
mains (MCDONALD’S-hamburgers), which could be due to 
chance. In essence, while Table 3A reports very weak evidence of 
blurring, Table 3B shows that once the proper control is used, 
even that very faint evidence of blurring disappears. 
Tables 4A and 4B, which report results for the same exper-
iments applied to the INFINITI mark, provide further support 
for the hypothesis that previous response time experiments 
failed to control for the effect of having any unexpected stimu-
lus. Table 4A reports treatment effects for the INFINITI treat-
ment group as compared to the first control group, and Table 4B 
reports treatment effects for the INFINITI treatment group as 
compared to the second control group. Consistent with our 
MERCEDES results, Table 4B shows that all statistically signif-
icant increases in mean response time disappeared when the 
second control group was also exposed to an ostensibly diluting ad. 
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TABLE 4A:  DIFFERENCES IN MEAN RESPONSE TIMES—TARGET 
BRAND: INFINITI—NO CONTROL FOR SURPRISE 
Treatment Group: Infinite Toothpaste Ad 
Control Group: No 4th Ad 












0.029 −0.078 0.125 0.108 0.131*** 












−0.022 0.121** 0.043 −0.023 0.024 











0.080 −0.038 −0.003 0.072** 0.038 











0.120** −0.013 −0.012 −0.099 0.031 











0.065 0.039 0.231** −0.013 −0.024 











0.083*** 0.226 0.045 −0.073 0.043 
(0.035) (0.161) (0.075) (0.073) (0.061)      
Standard errors in parentheses 
Two-tailed test: ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01  
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TABLE 4B:  DIFFERENCES IN MEAN RESPONSE TIMES—TARGET 
BRAND: INFINITI—CONTROLLING FOR SURPRISE 
Treatment Group: Infinite Toothpaste Ad 
Control Group: No Fourth Ad 












0.021 −0.014 −0.043 0.079 −0.043 












−0.046 0.034 −0.068 −0.071 −0.045 











0.023 −0.080 −0.020 0.037 −0.045 











−0.045 −0.158 −0.047 −0.063 −0.060 











−0.032 0.002 0.216 −0.100 −0.094 











−0.018 0.081 −0.034 −0.110 −0.201 
(0.041) (0.172) (0.076) (0.082) (0.121)      
Standard errors in parentheses 
Two-tailed test: ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
On the basis of this and our two pilot studies, we conclude 
that previous response time studies used an insufficient control. 
Thus, they cannot serve as models for surveys used in litigation 
or as evidence that ostensibly diluting conduct actually causes 
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any appreciable blurring of consumers’ ability to link marks 
with their traditional sources and associations. These previous 
studies used the equivalent of our first control group when they 
should have used the equivalent of our second control group. If 
future response time studies set out to detect dilution, whether 
in a litigation or academic context, they must expose control 
subjects to stimuli that, while not targeting the marks being 
tested for dilution, are at least as surprising or unexpected to 
control subjects as the ostensibly diluting stimuli to which 
treatment subjects are exposed. 
2. Category recall. 
In addition to response time, Morrin and Jacoby examined 
the accuracy of category-association matching as an indicator of 
trademark blurring.76 We did the same. We explored whether 
the MERCEDES Toothpaste and INFINITI Toothpaste ads had 
any impact on subjects’ ability to recall the traditional product 
categories of the MERCEDES or INFINITI marks. If the 
MERCEDES Toothpaste or INFINITI Toothpaste ads are caus-
ing blurring, we would expect fewer subjects in the treatment 
groups to identify MERCEDES-cars or INFINITI-cars as a 
match compared to subjects in the control groups. 
  
 
 76 Morrin and Jacoby, 19 J Pub Pol & Mktg at 268–69 (cited in note 14). 
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TABLE 5:  CATEGORY RECALL EXPERIMENT—DIFFERENCE 
BETWEEN TREATMENT GROUP MEAN AND CONTROL GROUP MEAN 
Panel A.     
Treatment Group: Mercedes/Infiniti Toothpaste Ad 
Control Group: No Fourth Ad       Mercedes-Cars  Infiniti-Cars  
 −0.006  −0.043  
 (0.015)  (0.027)            
Panel B.     
Treatment Group: Mercedes/Infiniti Toothpaste Ad 
Control Group: Nike Ad       Mercedes-Cars  Infiniti-Cars  
 −0.023**  −0.016  
 (0.012)  (0.028)       
Standard errors in parentheses 
Two-tailed test: ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Table 5 shows average treatment effects for the category recall 
tests in terms of the difference in percentages of correct classifi-
cations between the treatment groups and the first and second 
control groups. The negative signs on the coefficients indicate 
that treatment group subjects were less likely to state that 
MERCEDES-cars or INFINITI-cars is a match. These differ-
ences, however, were generally quite small and statistically sig-
nificant in just one of four cases. Panel A shows comparisons be-
tween treatment subjects and subjects in the first control group, 
who were exposed to the three filler ads only. The difference be-
tween treatment and control subjects on the MERCEDES-cars 
exercise was tiny and not statistically different from zero. In 
fact, 97.8 percent of subjects in the control group said these 
words were a match compared to 97.2 percent of subjects in the 
treatment group for a difference of 0.6 percent. The difference 
between treatment and control subjects on the INFINITI-cars 
exercise is slightly larger. Control group subjects identified 
these words as a match in 93.3 percent of cases compared to 
treatment subjects, who identified the words as a match in 89.0 
percent of cases. This difference, however, is not statistically 
significant. Turning to the MERCEDES-cars column in Panel B, 
we now find that there is a statistically significant difference be-
tween treatment and control groups when the control group sees 
a NIKE Toothpaste ad. Control group subjects said these words 
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were a match in 99.5 percent of cases compared to 97.2 percent 
of cases in the treatment group. We do not, however, observe a 
statistically significant difference in the INFINITI-cars column 
when the second control group saw a NIKE Toothpaste Ad. Con-
trol group subjects said INFINITI-cars is a match in 90.6 per-
cent of cases compared to 89.0 percent of cases among treatment 
group subjects. 
Taken together, the results presented in Table 5 show that 
subjects who saw a MERCEDES Toothpaste or INFINITI 
Toothpaste ad were always less accurate, on average, in tests 
that asked them to recall the primary product category of the 
MERCEDES or INFINITI marks. At the very least, this test in-
dicates that seeing an ad for a familiar brand name in an unex-
pected product category can cause a small number of people to 
dissociate a brand name from its primary product category. This 
test cannot tell us, however, whether what we are observing is 
dilution or that a small number of subjects became confused or 
distracted after seeing the toothpaste ads—that is, they thought 
that the association we had actually presented to them 
(MERCEDES-toothpaste; INFINITI-toothpaste) was the product 
category association we were asking about. Recall that, in 
Study 1, we found only very weak evidence that exposure to an 
ostensibly diluting stimulus lessened the strength of the associ-
ation between the mark and its product category or relevant 
product attributes.77 If the small reductions in product category 
recall we found for subjects in some, but not all, treatment 
branches in Study 3 were indeed related to product category dis-
sociation caused by blurring, rather than by subject confusion, 
we would expect to see a clearer reduction of the strength of as-
sociations in Study 1. 
III.  DOES TRADEMARK BLURRING EVER OCCUR? 
The research reported here confirms what the Supreme 
Court’s Moseley dictum suggests—that evidence that consumers 
associate a junior mark with a famous senior mark does not, as a 
matter of necessity, indicate that the senior mark is likely to suffer 
dilution via the blurring of its own associations with its source 
or other attributes.78 As a consequence, courts that have accept-
ed evidence of association as sufficient to establish a likelihood 
 
 77 See Part I.B.2. 
 78 Moseley, 537 US at 433–34. 
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of dilution have erred. Our research also describes an associa-
tion strength test for proving dilution and offers a path—set out 
in our discussion of Studies 1 and 2 in Part I.C—that courts can 
require plaintiffs pressing dilution claims to follow. Finally, our 
research casts substantial doubt on the validity of what previ-
ously had stood as the best evidence we have that the blurring 
form of trademark dilution actually exists. The response time 
studies that have been reported as (and assumed to be) evidence 
of blurring appear instead to be the result of treatment subjects’ 
surprise at seeing ads associating famous marks with products 
very different from those normally sold under such marks. We 
applied a redesigned control condition that accounts for the sur-
prise created by this unexpected stimulus, and the response de-
lays that we were previously able to reproduce disappeared al-
most entirely. 
Our experiments provide methodologically valid and judi-
cially administrable techniques for assessing the likelihood of 
blurring. Litigants can design studies to mimic our Studies 1 
and 2 or the revised version of the response time protocol that 
we present in Study 3. We prefer the methodologies of Studies 1 
and 2. They are easier to undertake and less subject to experi-
menter error, we believe, than the relatively complex response 
time study we present in Study 3. But we must confess that, 
though we have made a contribution by offering methods that 
both are administrable and possess construct validity, in a deeper 
sense we remain at sea. Our experiments do not settle the ques-
tion of the existence of trademark blurring. It is of course possi-
ble that future surveys used in litigation or academic empirical 
studies may be able to reliably detect “association” between two 
similar marks that “impairs the distinctiveness” of one of them. 
But at present, we have only very weak evidence that this form 
of dilution ever actually occurs. We have little more than “just so” 
stories, such as ours of a hypothetical Apple bar, that attempt to 
explain how dilution by blurring might operate. 
So where does that leave us? In this Part, we first consider 
an alternative interpretation of our findings in Study 3, one 
which we believe to be unconvincing. We then suggest that the 
theory of dilution by blurring remains such an unproven mess 
because, in practice, dilution is really about misappropriation. 
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A. Superdilution? 
There may be hope for the actuality of blurring in one inter-
pretation of our results in Study 3. This interpretation might 
hold that exposing consumers to surprising stimuli in the form 
of incongruous combinations of marks and new associations 
causes what might be termed “superdilution,” in which such 
surprising stimuli impair consumers’ ability to link marks with 
their traditional sources and associations for all marks through-
out the marketplace.79 Thus, when Brooklynites see Apple bar, 
their ability to navigate the marketplace as a whole marginally 
declines because they are reminded that the same mark may be 
used by more than one company. 
We find this interpretation of our results unpersuasive. We 
believe that the increased response times we detected prior to 
the application of our redesigned control condition are an arti-
fact of our experiment and not likely to translate to actual con-
sumer perception in the marketplace. Subjects in our experi-
ment are presented with a number of prompts, and they don’t 
know which prompts are salient. Therefore, as subjects proceed 
through the experiment, they are likely to treat every prompt as 
possibly salient. Subjects do not know what the experiment is 
about. So they keep at the front of their minds all potentially 
relevant information. And therefore, the surprising stimulus af-
fects behavior in our experiment. On the other hand, consumers 
in the marketplace rely on myriad contextual cues, as well as 
their own sense of their current aims, to decide what portion of 
the swarm of information coming at them every second to re-
gard, and what portion to disregard.80 As a consequence, con-
sumers may only rarely, if ever, treat an unexpected stimulus in 
the marketplace as salient. Consumers take the surprising in-
formation in as part of the welter of information, and unless the 
environment is set up at that moment to make it salient, they 
may never apply it to their mark-product or mark-attribute 
identification efforts. So if one sees a MERCEDES Toothpaste ad 
out in the marketplace, one might experience a moment of sur-
prise, but for the stimulus to have an effect on behavior, it would 
have to be salient to a particular task in which the observer is 
 
 79 This interpretation was offered by several legal scholars who commented on a 
prior draft of this Article. 
 80 See Tushnet, 86 Tex L Rev at 529–32 (cited in note 72). 
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engaged or will soon become engaged. Otherwise, it seems un-
likely that the surprise would affect behavior. 
B. Dilution and Misappropriation 
Given the absence of proof that dilution by blurring actually 
occurs, we are left to speculate that the problem may ultimately 
be not with our experiments or the surveys or experiments of 
others but with the concept of blurring itself. The notion of dilu-
tion originally emerged out of the 1924 German Odol case,81 
which was essentially a case about misappropriation, one which 
happened to involve a trademark.82 But when Professor Frank 
Schechter introduced the concept of dilution to American law in his 
still widely cited 1927 article, The Rational Basis of Trademark 
Protection,83 he downplayed the fact that dilution was a misap-
propriation doctrine and went so far as to expurgate from his 
translation of the Odol opinion the court’s core finding that the 
respondent had “appropriate[d] thus the fruit of another’s la-
bor.”84 Heavily influenced by law and economics thinking on 
trademark law, with its focus on consumer search costs, the 
American concept of dilution evolved into the concept of “blur-
ring” and the idea that, when two firms use the same mark, con-
sumers must “think for a moment,” which increases their search 
costs.85 We have struggled ever since to develop empirical proof 
that any appreciable increase in search costs actually occurs. 
Yet courts continue to rule in favor of plaintiffs on antidilu-
tion causes of action. We suggest, as others have,86 that they do 
 
 81 See Odol, 25 Juristiche Wochenschrift 502 (1924). See also Barton Beebe, The 
Suppressed Misappropriation Origins of Trademark Antidilution Law: The Landgericht 
Elberfeld’s Odol Opinion and Frank Schechter’s “The Rational Basis of Trademark 
Protection”, in Rochelle Cooper Dreyfus and Jane C. Ginsburg, eds, Intellectual Property 
at the Edge: The Contested Contours of IP 59, 64–70 (Cambridge 2014). 
 82 The Odol court asserted that the damage to the mark was to its “selling power.” 
See Beebe, The Suppressed Misappropriation Origins of Trademark Antidilution Law at 
60 (cited in note 81). 
 83 Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 Harv L Rev 
813, 830–33 (1927). 
 84 Beebe, The Suppressed Misappropriation Origins of Trademark Antidilution Law 
at 72 (cited in note 81). 
 85 See Posner, 21 J Legal Stud at 75 (cited in note 2). 
 86 See, for example, Apostolos Chronopoulos, Goodwill Appropriation as a Distinct 
Theory of Trademark Liability: A Study on the Misappropriation Rationale in Trade-
mark and Unfair Competition Law, 22 Tex Intell Prop L J 253, 296–97 (2014); David J. 
Franklyn, Debunking Dilution Doctrine: Toward a Coherent Theory of the Anti-free-rider 
Principle in American Trademark Law, 56 Hastings L J 117, 131–33 (2004); Richard A. 
660 The University of Chicago Law Review [86:611 
 
so primarily for reasons sounding in misappropriation, but never 
articulated as such. The concept of “blurring” acts as an alibi for 
courts that want to reach what they deem to be the right result 
in cases like Nikepal, in which a defendant uses another’s fa-
mous mark on unrelated goods. The defendant is not causing 
consumer confusion, but it is reaping where it has not sown by 
appropriating some of the notoriety of the famous mark. Courts 
are motivated to accept mere association survey evidence as full-
blown evidence of impairment to justify enjoining conduct they 
deem to be unfair misappropriation.87 
This is problematic for at least two reasons. First, we con-
tinue to twist ourselves into contortions to develop evidence of 
blurring, of some weakening of associations or increase in re-
sponse times and search costs, when courts’ underlying focus is 
on fairness and misappropriation. The result is that the concept 
of dilution grows increasingly vague and outcomes grow increas-
ingly unpredictable. Second, unlike its European counterpart,88 
the American antidilution statute contains no misappropriation 
provision. Congress has twice had the opportunity to include 
such a provision, and twice it has declined to do so.89 To the ex-
tent that courts are ruling on unstated misappropriation 
grounds, they are acting outside of the federal statutory frame-
work. 
CONCLUSION:  FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH 
The cause of action for trademark dilution by blurring has 
been authorized by federal law since 1996 and by the laws of 
various states for decades prior to that.90 And yet the concept 
that the law identifies and prohibits may not even exist out in 
 
Posner, Misappropriation: A Dirge, 40 Houston L Rev 621, 623 (2003); David S. Welkowitz, 
Reexamining Trademark Dilution, 44 Vand L Rev 531, 545–46 (1991). 
 87 See Nikepal, 84 USPQ2d at 1828 (finding dilution  based on a survey in which 
over 87 percent of participants responded that the word NIKEPAL brought to mind the 
NIKE brand). 
 88 See Directive 2015/2436 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
December 2015 to Approximate the Laws of the Member States Relating to Trade 
Marks, 2015 OJ L336 1, 9 (Dec 23, 2015) (prohibiting the unauthorized use of a qualify-
ing mark that “without due cause takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the dis-
tinctive character or the repute of the trade mark”). 
 89 See Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, 109 Stat 985; Trademark Dilution 
Revision Act of 2006, 120 Stat 1730 (replacing the Federal Trademark Dilution Act). 
 90 On state antidilution law, see McCarthy, 4 McCarthy on Trademarks § 24:77 at 
244–45 (cited in note 6). By 2016, about three-quarters of the states had some form of 
statutory antidilution law. Id at 244.  
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the world. Lawyers continue to litigate claims of dilution by 
blurring, but courts lack the most basic tool necessary for the 
disciplined adjudication of these claims: a reliable measure of 
the likelihood of dilution. 
The mere association test is entirely unsuitable as a test for 
dilution by blurring. At the level of logic, evidence of the associa-
tion between an ostensibly diluting use of a mark and the senior 
mark owner is not tantamount to evidence that the senior mark 
has become less associated with the senior mark owner, as is 
necessary for the senior mark’s distinctiveness to be impaired. 
And as our Studies 1 through 3 demonstrate, an ostensibly di-
luting use may lead to association with a new category without 
causing the required disassociation from the existing one. 
Our association strength test, and the tests we offer in 
Studies 1 and 2, are a more promising measure of the likelihood 
of dilution, but they must be undertaken carefully, and courts 
must be cautious in assessing the strength of evidence they pro-
duce. Similarly, response time tests may be a valid measure of 
the likelihood of dilution, but again, they must be constructed 
carefully. We have attempted to do so here. In particular, we 
found that previous response time studies failed to control for 
the surprising effect of the unexpected ostensibly diluting stimu-
lus. Once we controlled for that surprise-type effect, thereby iso-
lating in our experimental treatment the potential effect of dilu-
tion by blurring, we found that the evidence we’d previously 
found for blurring almost entirely disappeared. We also caution 
that, relative to our association strength tests, response time 
studies are difficult to administer and subject to experimenter 
error. 
This leaves us both better off and worse off than before. We 
believe that we have produced, at last, methodologically sound 
tests for measuring the likelihood of dilution. As applied to our 
test brands, however, none of the measures provided strong evi-
dence that dilution actually occurs. This is not to deny the possi-
bility that the measure might yield evidence of dilution if applied 
to other target brands with other ostensibly diluting stimuli or if 
respondents were repeatedly exposed to the stimuli longitudi-
nally over time.91 That is possible. But even if we applied it to 
 
 91 Though difficult to mount, particularly in the litigation context, a longitudinal 
study might show that repeated exposure to diluting stimuli would at some point gener-
ate evidence of blurring. We know of one cleverly designed small-scale pilot study that 
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other brands and measured significant reductions in association 
strength or response delays indicating the possibility of dilution, 
additional questions would arise. We would need to test the pos-
sible mitigating effect of market context. And most importantly, 
we would still need to test whether laboratory protocols to 
measure dilution by blurring that showed small average associa-
tion-strength treatment effects, small shifts in the distribution 
of Likert assessments of association strength, or small time delays 
in the nature of milliseconds were likely to translate into real-
world attribute association, preference, or purchase implications. 
In the end, these are questions that remain open. But we 
have an intuition about where the evidence will lead. We sus-
pect that the concept of dilution by blurring is a chimera—that 
is, an imaginary thing that we insist upon only because it is val-
uable to us as a proxy for attacking unauthorized uses of senior 
marks that our intuition tells us are unfair. It is true that, in at 
least some dilution cases, defendants are engaged in some form 
of free riding on the fame and goodwill enjoyed by the plaintiff’s 
mark. Free riding is, admittedly, not a simple thing to judge. 
Whether it is fair or unfair, productive or destructive, often de-
pends on subtle differences in context. But courts are better at 
judging these sorts of contextual questions than they are at 
running a social science inquiry into the hypothesized, but un-
proven, cognitive concept of “blurring.” It is better, we think, to 
reframe the dilution cause of action away from cognitive science 
and toward the broader and more tractable questions of fairness 
and harm that the courts have become accustomed to dealing 
with in misappropriation cases. 
APPENDIX A:  AMAZON MECHANICAL TURK 
We recruited subjects for our studies via Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk. Once a subject selected the task we listed on Mechanical 
Turk, he or she was directed to the Qualtrics online social sci-
ence research platform to complete a survey instrument. Our 
 
exposed thirteen undergraduate students weekly over the course of a month to a diluting 
stimulus in the form of a box of baked goods bearing the trademark CHEVROLET 
BAKERY. Results from a computer task showed no statistically significant treatment 
effect. See Dan Svirsky, Measuring Dilution: Is There an Effective Screening Device for 
Early Detection of Trademark Infections? *31–32 (working paper, 2012) (on file with au-
thors). By contrast, our goal in this Article has been to examine and rectify existing stud-
ies designed to detect dilution by blurring, all of which involve single-exposure protocols. 
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instrument reflected the procedures used by Professors Morrin 
and Jacoby and by Professors Pullig, Simmons, and Netemeyer.92 
Online crowdsourcing services like Amazon Mechanical 
Turk offer researchers the advantage of being able to run exper-
imental protocols on large samples at a fraction of the cost of lab 
studies. They also allow researchers to pilot various instruments 
so that hypotheses and empirical tools can be tested, refined, 
and retested. Online response time experiments are possible be-
cause JavaScript timers can record clicks down to the millisec-
ond. There are, however, some potential disadvantages to con-
ducting a response time experiment online that we investigated 
and addressed. Namely, subjects in an online experiment use 
their own hardware and software in contrast to a laboratory set-
ting, in which subjects use the same hardware and software. 
While there are surely differences in the connection speeds, 
browser speeds, processor speeds, and keyboard and mouse 
clicking speeds of subjects recruited through Amazon Mechanical 
Turk, we assume that these differences are small and randomly 
distributed across subjects. Professor Matthew Crump, John 
McDonnell, and Professor Todd Gureckis confirm this assump-
tion in a widely cited study that used subjects recruited through 
Mechanical Turk to replicate outcomes in four types of common 
laboratory reaction time studies.93 
To test whether differences caused by hardware, software, 
and network speed are actually randomly distributed, we col-
lected click-speed data from 980 Mechanical Turk respondents 
using the timer function in Qualtrics. All respondents were re-
quired to use a desktop or laptop computer with mouse and 
asked to perform the same exact tasks. First, they were told to 
click the “next” button eleven times. Second, they were told to 
click a single option on the screen, then click the “next” button. 
They did this ten times. Third, they were asked five easy multiple-
choice questions and then told to click the “next” button (for ex-
ample, “Which company sells hamburgers? Microsoft, Google, 
McDonald’s, or Facebook”). Qualtrics measured click speeds for 
each of the twenty-six tests to the thousandth of a second. 
 
 92 See Morrin and Jacoby, 19 J Pub Pol & Mktg at 268–69 (cited in note 14); Pullig, 
Simmons, and Netemeyer, 70 J Mtkg at 55–57 (cited in note 14). 
 93 Matthew J.C. Crump, John V. McDonnell, and Todd M. Gureckis, Evaluating 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk as a Tool for Experimental Behavioral Research, 8 PLOS 
ONE 1, 3–11 (2013). 
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We then randomly assigned respondents to two groups and 
compared mean click speeds. If the effects of hardware, soft-
ware, and network speeds are not randomly distributed, we 
should observe statistically significant differences in the group 
means. If these effects are randomly distributed, on the other 
hand, the differences between the group means should not be 
statistically different from zero due to the fact that the groups 
were created arbitrarily. Of course, we expected to observe some 
differences between the group means due to chance, but such 
differences should not be observed more than 5 percent of the 
time on average (at p < 0.05) if the effects of hardware, software, 
and network speeds are randomly distributed. 
We began by drawing 900 subjects (out of the 980 people 
surveyed) at random and randomly assigning them to two 
groups. We then compared the means of the two groups for each 
of the twenty-six questions. We observed statistically significant 
differences between the groups on two of the twenty-six ques-
tions. We then drew another random sample of nine hundred 
subjects and randomly assigned them to two groups. This time 
we observed a statistically significant difference between groups 
on one of the twenty-six questions. We repeated the procedure 
and again observed two statistically significant differences. On 
the fourth trial, we observed no statistically significant differ-
ences. We repeated this procedure a total of seventy times using 
various sample sizes: n = 100, n = 500, n = 700, n = 900, and 
n = 980. In sum, we compared 1,820 pairs (that is, 26 questions 
multiplied by 70 random draws). Overall, we observed statisti-
cally significant differences in 87 of the 1,820 comparisons—that is, 
slightly less than 5 percent of the time. The number of statisti-
cally significant differences did not seem to depend systematically 
on sample size.94 All together, these comparisons corroborate 
prior studies that argue that the effects of hardware, software, 
and network speeds in online response time tests are randomly 
distributed across subjects and thus do not systematically bias 
results. 
Another potential disadvantage is that subjects recruited 
online cannot be monitored to ensure that they are following 
 
 94 For example, we observed statistically significant differences in 3.46 percent of 
the comparisons when the sample size was 100. This number rose to 6.15 percent when 
the sample size was 500, decreased to 3.46 percent when the sample size was 700, in-
creased to 5.77 percent when the sample size was 900, then decreased to 5.38 percent 
when the sample size was 980. 
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instructions or remaining attentive to the experiment. One in-
struction we feared might be broken was that subjects use a lap-
top or desktop computer with a mouse or touchpad, not a 
touchscreen device like a tablet or smartphone. To ensure that 
we were measuring reaction times of only people using a mouse 
or touchpad, we applied a setting in Qualtrics that prohibited 
people with touchscreen mobile operating systems from partici-
pating in the experiment. To make sure subjects were paying at-
tention to the experiment, we examined the data closely for in-
valid responses. We coded nine response times as missing values 
because they were greater than fifty seconds, which we believe 
signaled disengagement during the matching task. These exces-
sively large response times constituted less than 0.02 percent of 
all response time values in our data set.95 Ninety-nine percent of 
response times in our data set were three seconds or less, which 
we believe indicates that the vast majority of subjects were fo-
cused and engaged. 
  
 
 95 During the data cleaning phase, we also found that a small fraction of response 
times (1.08 percent) were zero. We coded these values as missing as well. 
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